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BENJAMIN P. EDWARDS* 
The regulatory structure for financial advice now tolerates incentives 
motivating financial advisors to manipulate and deceive retail 
investors. While scholars thus far have argued for ways to improve 
investor protections, the literature has largely ignored how these 
flawed incentives affect the economy. 
 
This Article contends that these flawed incentives cause financial 
advisors to negatively affect capital allocation throughout the overall 
economy. 
 
This Article draws on literature about manipulation and deception in 
principal-agent relationships to show how conflicts of interest cause 
the market for financial advisor services to generate excessive 
intermediation, driving harms to the real economy. This Article uses 
case studies of non-traded real estate investment trusts and closed-end 
funds to illustrate how financial advisor conflicts of interest contribute 
to inefficient capital allocation and inefficiency in the market for 
institutional intermediation. 
 
To address this issue, this Article argues that an effective policy 
response will address compensation incentives and focus on limiting 
the ability of conflicts of interest to skew capital allocation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In December 2015, JPMorgan Chase paid $307 million to the U.S. 
government because it failed to inform its clients about its conflicts of 
interest.1 In particular, JPMorgan did not tell clients that it was investing client 
assets in JPMorgan’s proprietary, higher-fee funds.2 These higher-fee funds 
would generate more revenue for JPMorgan, but cause clients to earn 
significantly lower returns.3 
                                                                                                                     
 1 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, J.P. Morgan to Pay $267 Million for 
Disclosure Failures (Dec. 18, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-283.html 
[https://perma.cc/6KDL-UEPX] (describing related settlements totaling $307 million). 
 2 Id. 
 3 See OFFICE OF INV’R EDUC. & ADVOCACY, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, PUB. NO. 
164, INVESTOR BULLETIN: HOW FEES AND EXPENSES AFFECT YOUR INVESTMENT 
PORTFOLIO (Feb. 2014), http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/ib_fees_expenses.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AA2K-MXBS] (explaining the significant impact of fees over time on 
returns). 
2017] CONFLICTS & CAPITAL ALLOCATION 183 
JPMorgan’s actions are hardly unique.4 Undoubtedly, many financial 
advisors direct clients to invest in higher-fee funds that generate greater 
revenues for the advisors.5 This regularly occurs even though client interests 
are almost always better served through simpler, lower-fee funds.6 While 
others have argued that advisor conflicts of interest hurt savings outcomes for 
ordinary investors,7 this Article argues that these conflicts of interest also 
cause systemic capital misallocation.8  
Commission compensation structures may lead even well-meaning 
financial advisors to recommend unwise investments to their clients.9 The 
                                                                                                                     
 4 One former employee alleged that at Goldman Sachs, “people push the envelope 
and pitch lucrative and complicated products to clients even if they are not the simplest 
investments or the ones most directly aligned with the client’s goals[.]” Greg Smith, Why I 
Am Leaving Goldman Sachs, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/0 
3/14/opinion/why-i-am-leaving-goldman-sachs.html [https://perma.cc/HJ4Y-LZG8]. Other 
banks have faced fines for similar behavior. WILLIAM A. BIRDTHISTLE, EMPIRE OF THE 
FUND: THE WAY WE SAVE NOW 86–87 (2016) (explaining that Edward Jones, Morgan 
Stanley, Ameriprise, and Citigroup have faced similar fines).  
 5 See generally Susan E.K. Christoffersen et al., What Do Consumers’ Fund Flows 
Maximize? Evidence from Their Brokers’ Incentives, 68 J. FIN. 201 (2013) (documenting 
that broker recommendations increase broker profits). 
 6 See Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Beyond Diversification: The Pervasive Problem of 
Excessive Fees and “Dominated Funds” in 401(k) Plans, 124 YALE L.J. 1476, 1488 (2015) 
(“The issue of fees is important because a substantial body of academic and industry 
research suggests that high-cost funds are poor investment options.”). 
 7 For decades, financial services firms have advertised their services and stressed that 
consumers should come to them for advice. See Arthur B. Laby, Selling Advice and 
Creating Expectations: Why Brokers Should Be Fiduciaries, 87 WASH. L. REV. 707, 756 
(2012) (documenting that brokerage firms have long advertised that they provide 
personalized advice); Joseph C. Peiffer & Christine Lazaro, Major Investor Losses Due to 
Conflicted Advice: Brokerage Industry Advertising Creates the Illusion of a Fiduciary 
Duty: Misleading Ads Fuel Confusion, Underscore Need for Fiduciary Standard, 22 
PIABA B.J. 1, 1 (2015) (contrasting advertisements purporting to put client interests first 
with arbitration defenses from the same institutions arguing that they do not owe a duty to 
put client interests before their own). Most Americans operate under the mistaken belief 
that all financial advisors have some legal duty to provide advice in the best interests of 
their clients. While some financial advisors may have such a duty, many do not. U.S. SEC. 
& EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS i (2011) 
[hereinafter FIDUCIARY STUDY], http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZRE7-PA3Q]. 
 8 The ultimate goal for financial regulation must be to improve capital allocation. See 
Wallace C. Turbeville, A New Perspective on the Costs and Benefits of Financial 
Regulation: Inefficiency of Capital Intermediation in a Deregulated System, 72 MD. L. 
REV. 1173, 1176 (2013) (“[T]he principal social value of financial markets is not to assure 
the lowest transaction costs for market participants. Rather, it is to facilitate the efficient 
deployment of funds held by investors to productive uses.”). 
 9 To be sure, some financial advisors do owe fiduciary duties to give advice in the 
best interests of their clients. For discussions of the divergent standards governing financial 
advisors, see generally Christine Lazaro & Benjamin P. Edwards, The Fragmented 
Regulation of Investment Advice: A Call for Harmonization, 4 MICH. BUS. & 
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average investor, like someone trying to save for retirement, has many choices 
in how to invest her money. Many such investors turn to financial advisors for 
guidance, and those advisors are often compensated through sales 
commissions.10 Some products offer the advisors larger commissions, and 
advisors have an incentive to steer clients toward products that maximize 
advisor commissions.11 This incentive structure causes significant losses for 
ordinary savers—an estimated $17 billion per year.12  
This Article argues that these incentive structures do not merely hurt 
individual investors and reward advisors, but in fact, drive the creation of 
needlessly complex financial products and retard economic growth.13 These 
structures also increase systemic risk and magnify the likelihood of future 
financial crashes.14 
                                                                                                                     
ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 47 (2014), and Benjamin P. Edwards, Fiduciary Duty and 
Investment Advice: Will a Uniform Fiduciary Duty Make a Material Difference?, 14 J. 
BUS. & SEC. L. 105 (2014). 
 10 Donald C. Langevoort, Brokers as Fiduciaries, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 439, 445 
(2010). 
 11 See id. at 448–49 (suggesting that one solution to the problem might be to limit 
“differential commissions that cannot be justified in terms of the effort necessary to sell the 
product knowledgeably and responsibly, for example”). 
 12 In the aggregate, conflicted financial advice causes ordinary retail investors, i.e. 
individual, household, or noninstitutional investors, to transfer significant sums from their 
savings to their financial advisors. In February of 2015, the White House Council of 
Economic Advisers released a report on conflicted investment advice, conservatively 
estimating that “the aggregate annual cost of conflicted advice is about $17 billion each 
year” for retirement savers. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, THE EFFECTS OF CONFLICTED 
INVESTMENT ADVICE ON RETIREMENT SAVINGS 2 (Feb. 2015). In practical terms, retirees 
receiving conflicted advice will run out of savings more than five years earlier than if they 
had received unbiased advice. Id. at 3. When these retirees deplete their savings, they may 
consume more public resources or depend on support from their families, reducing the next 
generation’s ability to save and invest for the future. See Lynn A. Stout, The Corporation 
as a Time Machine: Intergenerational Equity, Intergenerational Efficiency, and the 
Corporate Form, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 685, 686 (2015) (describing how current 
shareholders can have intergenerational impacts). 
 13 See, e.g., Siong Hook Law & Nirvikar Singh, Does Too Much Finance Harm 
Economic Growth?, 41 J. BANKING & FIN. 36, 36 (2014); Jean-Louis Arcand et al., Too 
Much Finance? 3 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 12/161, 2012), 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12161.pdf [https://perma.cc/XSL2-5VLP]; 
Stephen G. Cecchetti & Enisse Kharroubi, Reassessing the Impact of Finance on Growth 1 
(Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 381, 2012), http://www.bis.org/publ/work3 
81.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3G9-U5YM]; cf. Kathryn Judge, Intermediary Influence, 82 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 573, 575 (2015) (“[R]ecent studies suggest that the relationship between the 
size of a country’s financial sector and the rate of its development is an inverted ‘U’—
having a robust financial system is critical for economic growth, but too much finance 
impedes development.”). 
 14 See Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation, 
Complexity, and Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657, 725 (2012) (“[C]omplexity arising 
from the spread of financial innovations may contribute to systemic risk . . . .”); Steven L. 
Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 198–99 (2008) (“[F]inancial institutions . . . are 
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This Article argues that prohibiting commission-based compensation for 
financial advisors will substantially reduce these problems.15 Eliminating this 
corrosive conflict of interest will improve the flow of capital, reduce systemic 
risk, and reshape financial services culture in a way that protects ordinary 
investors.  
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part II discusses how financial advisor 
conflicts of interest negatively affect the capital markets and destabilize the 
financial system as a whole. Part III argues that banning commission 
compensation for financial advisors will improve capital allocation and market 
functioning. Part IV considers alternative solutions and the implications of 
regulating commission compensation structures.  
II. THE CONFLICTED INVESTMENT ADVICE PROBLEM 
The capital markets exist for two purposes: (i) to allocate capital to the 
most profitable opportunities (on the macroeconomic level); and (ii) to help 
market participants invest or borrow money (on the microeconomic level).16 
Much has been said about the second purpose and how conflicts of interest 
between financial advisors and retail investors frustrate individual attempts to 
save for the future.17 Yet these conflicts of interest also affect the broader 
economy by distorting the ways in which capital flows to fund business 
opportunities.  
The capital markets drive economic growth by moving capital from savers 
to opportunities in need of capital.18 The capital markets’ ability to allocate 
                                                                                                                     
important sources of capital. Therefore, their failure, especially in large numbers, can 
deprive society of capital and increase its cost. Increases in the cost of capital, or decreases 
in its availability, are the most serious direct consequences of a systemic failure.”). 
 15 While the proposal might appear radical in the United States, other nations have 
already taken this approach; commission-driven investment advice for retail investors has 
been banned in the United Kingdom, Australia, and the Netherlands. JEREMY BURKE & 
ANGELA A. HUNG, FINANCIAL ADVICE MARKETS: A CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISON 8, 12, 
20–21 (2015), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR12 
69/RAND_RR1269.pdf [https://perma.cc/H6AC-XP3E]. 
 16 Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing Financial Regulation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1, 35 
(2010) (“The basic goals of the markets have remained the same – namely, the efficient 
allocation, transfer, and deployment of capital resources and risk-bearing.”); see also Stout, 
supra note 12, at 686 (explaining that capital markets “can transform wealth that will be 
generated in the future into wealth that can be enjoyed today in the form of a higher share 
price”). 
 17 See generally Tamar Frankel, The Regulation of Brokers, Dealers, Advisers and 
Financial Planners, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 123 (2010); Thomas Lee Hazen, Are 
Existing Stock Broker Standards Sufficient? Principles, Rules, and Fiduciary Duties, 2010 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 710; Steven D. Irwin et al., Wasn’t My Broker Always Looking Out 
for My Best Interests? The Road to Become a Fiduciary, 12 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 41 (2009). 
 18 See JOHN KAY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY: THE REAL BUSINESS OF FINANCE 135 
(2015) (“A central function of financial markets is to direct money from savers to 
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capital to fund the development of more real assets depends on how well 
financial assets are priced to faithfully reflect the value of the real assets 
behind their returns.19 For example, if two firms both seek capital to open a 
restaurant or build a plant, the opportunity that will “generate more profits per 
invested dollar is the more desirable real investment and should attract funds 
first.”20 If the market prices for these new financial assets reflect the 
underlying merits and risks of the opportunity, the better opportunity will offer 
better returns.21 If financial assets are not priced accurately, the capital 
markets will not allocate capital as efficiently.22 There is an inexorable link 
between capital allocation and the health of the macroeconomy.23 As 
explained below, conflicted investment advice drives capital misallocation, 
causing significant macroeconomic and other harms. 
A variety of financial intermediaries play significant roles in moving 
capital through the economy.24 Institutional intermediaries, such as pensions 
and mutual funds, manage pools of assets for their investors. Banks, broker-
dealer firms, insurance companies, and others may innovate and create new 
                                                                                                                     
businesses, home-owners and governments. They in turn use these savings to build, own 
and operate houses, shops, offices, warehouses and factories . . . .”). 
 19 See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly 
Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 769 (1985) (explaining that 
in a fundamentally or allocatively efficient market, the financial returns for a particular 
investment opportunity will correspond to the discounted present value of its shares).  
 20 Id. 
 21 The capital markets function well when capital flows to its best use and funds these 
opportunities. See Alicia J. Davis, Market Efficiency and the Problem of Retail Flight, 20 
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 36, 45 (2014) (“Allocative efficiency requires capital to be directed 
to its highest and best use.”); Kevin Haeberle, Stock-Market Law and the Accuracy of 
Public Companies’ Stock Prices, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 121, 137 (“[W]hen stock 
prices are accurate, firms with superior prospects—that is, those with higher values—will 
generally draw more capital and firms with inferior ones—that is, those with smaller 
expected future cash flows—will draw less.”). 
 22 See James D. Cox, Coping in a Global Marketplace: Survival Strategies for a 75-
Year-Old SEC, 95 VA. L. REV. 941, 956 (2009) (“[I]naccurate securities prices impair the 
allocational efficiency of capital markets, a central objective of securities regulation.”); 
Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41 
DUKE L.J. 977, 1005 (1992) (“Inaccurate stock prices can result in an inefficient allocation 
of capital.”). 
 23 Binyamin Appelbaum, This Time, Cheaper Oil Does Little for the U.S. Economy, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/22/business/energy-
environment/this-time-cheaper-oil-does-little-for-the-us-economy.html [https://perma.cc/U 
U84-834X] (“There’s a feedback between financial markets and the economy. . . . [Even if] 
markets are irrational . . . that spills over into the real economy.” (quoting Andrew T. 
Levin, former adviser to Federal Reserve Chair Janet L. Yellen)). 
 24 For a definition of financial intermediaries, see Kristin N. Johnson, Governing 
Financial Markets: Regulating Conflicts, 88 WASH. L. REV. 185, 187 n.2 (2013), who 
defines “financial intermediaries” as “privately owned and controlled businesses that 
provide fundamental financial services to financial market participants.” 
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financial products. Many investors now rely on different financial advisors for 
assistance navigating this constantly evolving landscape.25  
Of course, these financial advisors have their own interests to pursue as 
well. Collectively, conflicts of interest at the retail level have macroeconomic 
impacts because of the size of the capital pool being allocated.26 Recent 
information indicates that as of 2013, U.S. households controlled equity 
securities valued at over $13.3 trillion.27 For the most part, retail investors now 
channel these assets through institutional intermediaries.28 This Article focuses 
on how and why retail investor funds flow to particular intermediaries and 
what this means for the market for institutional intermediation, business 
culture, and the economy as a whole.  
A. Assessing the Quality of Financial Advice 
In some respects, financial advice may resemble wine ratings for two 
reasons: (i) opinions about quality vary wildly; and (ii) higher-cost does not 
yield higher quality.29 With respect to the first, no uniform standard exists to 
set the scope for personalized financial advice. Some investors may prefer a 
financial advisor that assists only with asset allocation. Others may prefer 
more assistance with other financial decisions, such as whether to buy a home 
and how and when to claim their Social Security benefits. In some instances, a 
preference for a higher level of customer service may justify the decision to 
pay a financial advisor more for assistance. 
While it may be difficult to identify the best advice in any particular 
situation, basic care and loyalty standards seem likely to generate higher 
quality advice. Investors may receive higher quality advice when their 
financial advisor exercises reasonable care to understand the customer’s 
                                                                                                                     
 25 For a detailed discussion of the different types of financial advisors now serving the 
retail market, see infra Part III.B. 
 26 The retail capital allocation problem will continue to expand because shifting 
economic relationships have also fundamentally restructured the retail investment. For a 
thorough discussion of this change and its implications, see JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT 
RISK SHIFT: THE ASSAULT ON AMERICAN JOBS, FAMILIES, HEALTH CARE, AND RETIREMENT 
AND HOW YOU CAN FIGHT BACK (2006). 
 27 SIFMA, 2016 FACT BOOK 80 (2016). 
 28 See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization 
of the Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1026 (2009) (“The last thirty years or so 
have brought a rapid shift toward institutionalization.”); Anne M. Tucker, The Outside 
Investor: Citizen Shareholders & Corporate Alienation, 11 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 99, 105–06 
(2013) (“With self-directed defined-contribution plans, participants began to rely heavily 
on mutual and index funds as investment options, thus increasing the number of indirect 
investors and the significance of institutional investors.” (footnote omitted)). 
 29 See Further Evidence that Wine Tasting Is Wildly Subjective, FREAKONOMICS (July 
8, 2013), http://freakonomics.com/2013/07/08/further-evidence-that-wine-tasting-is-wildly 
-subjective/ [https://perma.cc/7KMF-V2PW] (“A few years ago, we did a podcast on 
whether expensive wine tastes better. There is now further evidence that the answer to that 
question is no—even for elite wine critics.”). 
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situation and confirm that the advice given about particular products or 
strategies is not based on inaccurate or incomplete information.30 Good advice 
will also be loyal advice—given in the customer’s best interests as opposed to 
the best interests of the financial advisor. 
B. Puzzling Product Purchases 
At present, a significant volume of investment advice is not given in 
investors’ best interests. This may be inferred because far too many investors 
make decisions that appear irreconcilable with wealth-maximization motives. 
Consider puzzling investor decisions to purchase Non-traded or Non-listed 
Real Estate Investment Trusts (Non-Traded REITs) and the initial public 
offering (IPO) of closed-end funds. As explained below, frequent purchases of 
these products seem unlikely absent a commission-based incentive to steer 
clients into these products. While this Article profiles two frequently 
exploitative offerings, there are many other financial products that either 
should not be sold or should be sold much less often.31 
1. Non-Traded Real Estate Investment Trusts 
Non-traded REITs appear cynically designed to make it possible for 
financial intermediaries to advance their own interests at the expense of their 
clients in the primary market. Curiously, while non-traded REITs have long 
been a concern for consumer advocates, they are little discussed in the legal 
literature.32 Despite this, financial advisors have channeled billions of dollars 
of retail investor capital into non-traded REIT offerings.33 
                                                                                                                     
 30 See FIDUCIARY STUDY, supra note 7, at 120–21. 
 31 See, e.g., JOSHUA M. BROWN, BACKSTAGE WALL STREET 209–22 (2012) 
(describing a range of financial products as “murder holes”); Ann Lipton, I Do Not Think It 
Means What You Think It Means, BUS. L. PROF BLOG (May 7, 2016), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2016/05/you-keep-using-that-word-i-do-no 
t-think-it-means-what-you-think-it-means.html [https://perma.cc/HNM2-MG28] (“The 
story begins with variable annuities, a product that might be suitable if you’re trying to 
shelter your assets from a lawsuit, but otherwise one whose chief virtue lies in its capacity 
to serve as a litmus test for the honesty of your broker.”). 
 32 See BROWN, supra note 31, at 219 (“[T]here are huge questions surrounding the 
selling of private real estate investment trusts . . . .”); Barbara Black, Curbing Broker-
Dealers’ Abusive Sales Practices: Does Professor Jensen’s Integrity Framework Offer a 
Better Approach?, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 771, 778 (2013) (“FINRA and State 
Attorneys General have brought enforcement actions against broker-dealers for abusive 
practices in the sale of non-traded REITs to unsophisticated investors.”). 
 33 See Micah Hauptman, Why Investors Should Think Twice About Nontraded REITs, 
WALL STREET J. (Nov. 13, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/experts/2015/11/13/why-investors-
should-think-twice-about-nontraded-reits/ [https://perma.cc/M3AY-HEFA] (“Investors 
purchased at least $116 billion in nontraded REITs over the last 25 years and are at least 
$45 billion worse off than they would have been if they had merely invested in a 
diversified portfolio of traded REITs . . . .”). 
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Non-traded REITs are a subset of REITs. REITs are quasi-corporate 
entities that provide a tax-advantaged vehicle for investors to invest in real 
estate.34 A REIT takes a pool of investor capital and uses that money to buy 
income-producing properties.35 Typical REIT holdings include apartment 
buildings, commercial properties, or even timber-producing land.36 Often, 
investors will purchase REITs to access the steady income from tenants’ rent 
payments.37 
There are a variety of REITs available for retail investors seeking income 
or to diversify their portfolio by holding real estate.38 Both traded and non-
traded REITs are registered with the SEC and provide the public with annual 
and quarterly reports.39 Both invest in real estate and receive preferential tax 
treatment for paying dividends.40 There are other differences—particularly in 
the fees charged. Non-traded REITs generally come with initial offering fees 
and expenses between 12% to 15% of the offering, which is quite high.41 
Given the fee level, financial advisors receive extraordinarily high 
compensation for selling these non-traded REIT shares to retail investors.42 
One recent study found that these non-traded REITs average upfront fees 
amounting to 13.2% of invested capital.43 This means that, on average, an 
investor seeking to put $100,000 to work in the capital markets will actually 
only put in about $86,800, losing $13,200 to commissions and fees. In 
contrast, an investor seeking real estate exposure could also buy $100,000 
worth of traded-REIT shares for a trading commission of $10 or less. 
                                                                                                                     
 34 See Public Non-Traded REITs—Perform a Careful Review Before Investing, 
FINRA, http://www.finra.org/investors/protectyourself/investoralerts/reits/p124232 [https:// 
perma.cc/LWL7-7TJS] (last updated Nov. 30, 2016). 
 35 See id. 
 36 SIMON LACK, WALL STREET POTHOLES 3 (2016). 
 37 Id. 
 38 See Office of Inv’r Educ. & Advocacy, Investor Bulletin: Non-Traded REITs, U.S. 
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Aug. 31, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-
bulletins/ib_nontradedreits.html [https://perma.cc/4WMA-CW84]. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Robbie Whelan, Nontraded REITs Are Hot, but Have Plenty of Critics: As 
Investors Pour Money into Funds, Skeptics See Better Alternatives, WALL STREET J. (June 
15, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/nontraded-reits-offer-high-returns-but-critics-cite-
fees-and-illiquidity-1402670753 [https://perma.cc/V9DV-58EW]. Writing about a high-fee 
REIT in 2005, David F. Swensen, the chief investment officer of Yale University, argued 
that the “most generous characterizations of [these] fees range from obscene to 
despicable.” DAVID F. SWENSEN, UNCONVENTIONAL SUCCESS: A FUNDAMENTAL 
APPROACH TO PERSONAL INVESTMENT 71 (2005). 
 42 See Office of Inv’r Educ. & Advocacy, supra note 38. 
 43 Brian Henderson et al., An Empirical Analysis of Non-Traded REITs, 19 J. WEALTH 
MGMT. 83–84 (2016). 
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Non-traded REITs allow financial advisors to exploit a sophistication gap 
between themselves and their clients.44 Retail investors struggle to understand 
the actual fees and expenses involved with non-traded REITs because they do 
not pay the commissions directly, rendering the true cost opaque until and 
unless the investor reads and understands the fine print.45 Indeed, it seems 
unlikely that many fully informed persons would opt to purchase shares in a 
non-traded REIT if they understood the fee structure and other options 
available. One critic of non-traded REIT sales encapsulated what an honest 
discussion of the typical non-traded REIT fees would sound like, with the 
representative saying: 
If you invest $100,000 I will be paid a commission of $7,000. My firm is 
going to get $1,500 – $2,000 in revenue share. My wholesaler, the salesman 
that works for the investment’s sponsor company, will get $1,000. He is a 
great guy, buys me dinner all of the time and takes me golfing. The sponsor 
company is going to get around $3,000 to pay for some of the costs they 
incurred in setting up the investment. So all in on Day 1 there will be around 
$87,000 left over to actually invest. I bet you are getting excited.46 
Financial advisors may not have paid appropriate reputational costs for 
selling non-traded REITs with outsize fees and expenses because the illiquid 
products have, for some time, appeared on retail investor brokerage statements 
at the price retail investors paid for them.47 Investors purchasing these non-
traded REITs for $10 per share saw post-purchase statements listing a price 
per share of $10—notwithstanding that a significant percentage of the 
investment had already been diverted to fees and expenses.48 When the price 
per share updates to a more accurate figure after a long expanse of time, a 
financial advisor may deflect responsibility by pointing to uncertainty within 
                                                                                                                     
 44 To be sure, many financial advisors may not personally understand the superior 
alternatives. Their broker-dealer firm may have only trained them to sell non-traded REITs. 
 45 BROWN, supra note 31, at 219 (“[O]f course that 7 percent commission is built into 
the offering price; the client never sees it or feels it (and in many cases doesn’t even know 
about it).”). 
 46 Joshua M. Brown, Scenes from an Independent Brokerage Firm, REFORMED 
BROKER (May 21, 2014), http://thereformedbroker.com/2014/05/21/scenes-from-an-indepe 
ndent-brokerage-firm/ [https://perma.cc/FW7V-FY2Z] (describing non-traded REITs as 
“just absolute murderholes for clients – they pay the brokers so much that they cannot 
possibly work out”). 
 47 Order Approving FINRA Proposed Rule Change Relating to Per Share Estimated 
Valuations for Unlisted DPP and REIT Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 34-73339, 79 
Fed. Reg. 62489 (Oct. 10, 2014).  
 48 See id. at 62491 (approving a valuation rule change to alter the “practice of 
displaying a DPP or REIT security’s immutable offering price as its per share estimated 
value on customer account statements throughout the offering period (which can last 
several years)”). 
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the broader financial markets.49 Or, the product may show gains above the 
purchase price, effectively camouflaging the portion raked off by 
intermediaries. While a recent rule change requiring the disclosure of a more 
accurate per-share value post-sale may provide more transparency, the impact 
of the alteration remains to be seen.50  
Still, early reports indicate that some financial advisors intend to sell less 
of these products now that clients may be more likely to appreciate the fees. 
For example, one financial advisor with Cetera Financial Group recently said 
that he would no longer sell the products because he did not “want to have any 
clients ever saying, ‘Oh, yeah, by the way, how come this is $88,000 instead 
of $100,000?’”51 While the financial advisor claimed to have previously 
discussed fees and expenses with his clients, the decision to stop selling the 
products under a modified disclosure regime supports the inference that the 
products were sold because clients did not appreciate the costs.52 In contrast, 
purchasers of publicly traded REITs immediately know the market value of 
their shares from the public market price.  
Capital misallocation may also be observed because non-traded REITs 
tend to underperform publicly traded REITs.53 One analysis found that “had 
non-traded REIT investors instead invested in a low-cost and liquid REIT 
mutual fund, they would have accumulated $44 billion more than they 
accumulated in the non-traded REITs. Non-traded REITs’ average annual 
returns are 4.0%, compared to 11.3% in a traded REIT portfolio.”54 The 
                                                                                                                     
 49 Given a long enough expanse of time, the updated per share value may even show 
an increase over the initial sale price if the underlying assets have appreciated in value. 
While a retail investor may see a positive return in absolute terms, the product will almost 
certainly have significantly underperformed a publicly traded REIT. 
 50 Under soon-to-be-enforced rules, broker-dealer firms will have to provide updated 
per share valuations to their clients. See FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., REGULATORY 
NOTICE 15-02: DPP AND UNLISTED REIT SECURITIES (Jan. 2015), https://www.finra.org/sit 
es/default/files/notice_doc_file_ref/Notice_Regulatory_15-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y74R-
AW9U] (explaining the new valuation methods to go into effect in April of 2016); see also 
LACK, supra note 36, at 8 (explaining that the lack of a public trading market for non-
traded REITs inhibits investors from discovering the actual value of their shares—and by 
extension the REIT); Chuck Jaffe, Non-Traded REIT Is a Non-Starter, MARKETWATCH 
(Nov. 4, 2011), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/non-traded-reit-is-a-non-starter-2011-
11-04 [https://perma.cc/Y554-JCRR] (explaining that investors should not rely on the 
stated share value because “management won’t even calculate net asset value until 18 
months after the completion of the offering, and that the current share value is ‘arbitrary’”). 
 51 Ann Marsh, Commissions Exposed, Adviser Stops Selling Nontraded REITs, FIN. 
PLAN. (June 8, 2016) (quoting Colin Mackenzie, financial advisor, Cetera Financial 
Group), http://www.financial-planning.com/news/commissions-exposed-adviser-stops-selli 
ng-nontraded-reits [https://perma.cc/DSW4-9RVQ]. 
 52 See id. (quoting Knut Rostad of the Institute for the Fiduciary Standard as 
remarking that the financial advisor “only made these sales because he could hide what he 
charged for them”). 
 53 See Henderson et al., supra note 43, at 84. 
 54 See id. 
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underperformance of non-traded REITs appears even more puzzling because 
illiquid assets should return a premium over liquid assets.55  
This underperformance indicates likely fundamental, allocative 
inefficiency in the capital markets. Some of this allocative inefficiency may be 
attributable to the deceptive and manipulative marketing strategies employed 
by the issuers and financial advisors—raising a question as to whether the non-
traded REIT sector attracts capital on its merit or its ability to bias 
intermediaries by paying above average fees. To the extent that it attracts 
capital by biasing intermediaries, other issuers suffer from increased capital 
costs and attract less investor capital than would be expected on the merits of 
their offerings. 
This inefficiency affects the real economy. When non-traded REITs use 
conflicted financial advice to gather an outsized amount of capital, it causes 
excessive capital to flow to the real estate market—driving up the prices of 
real assets.56 If the equilibrium were different—rewarding more competition 
on the merits and the risks instead of efforts to bias financial advisors, these 
products would likely attract less capital, freeing it for more productive uses. 
2. Closed-End Funds 
Capital misallocation on account of financial advisors manipulating and 
deceiving retail investors may also be observed with the sale of closed-end 
funds (CEFs) to retail investors.57 Few investment options seem less attractive 
than buying the shares of a closed-end fund in an IPO, particularly if similar 
CEFs already exist.58 Indeed, the continuing existence of CEFs has puzzled 
economists for decades.59 Because the IPO shares are sold at a premium and 
will soon trade at a significant discount, economists cannot discern any good 
reason why a rational investor would purchase CEF shares in an IPO instead 
                                                                                                                     
 55 See Yair Listokin, Taxation and Liquidity, 120 YALE L.J. 1682, 1689 (2011) (“A 
considerable body of both theoretical and empirical evidence demonstrates that the 
liquidity of an asset is an important determinant of its return, with more liquidity being 
associated with a lower return.”). 
 56 See SWENSEN, supra note 41, at 75 (“No rational buyer can compete with the 
[REITs’] willingness to overpay for product. . . . [I]nvestors suffer the double indignity of 
high fees and poor investment prospects.”). 
 57 For an argument that CEF IPOs do not appear to be in the best interests of 
customers, see Benjamin P. Edwards, Closed-End Fund IPO Considerations, 22 PIABA 
B.J. 283, 283 (2015), who notes that “absent a compelling reason, investors should 
generally avoid purchasing CEF shares in an initial public offering (IPO).” 
 58 See BROWN, supra note 31, at 221 (“These funds should only be bought at a 
discount in the secondary market. Within 90 days of the IPO, the ‘penalty bid’ phase ends 
and brokers can freely dump shares while keeping their commissions—you will be down 
15 percent in a blink.”). 
 59 See Charles M.C. Lee et al., Anomalies: Closed-End Mutual Funds, 4 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 153, 154 (1990). 
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of purchasing the shares of a CEF already on the market.60 If no rational 
investor would buy CEF shares during an IPO, then CEFs should eventually 
cease to exist in a rational expectation equilibrium because new CEFs would 
not be created.61 Yet CEF IPOs persist, and stockbrokers continue to sell CEF 
shares to retail investors, despite a long record of underperformance.62 Their 
continued existence is best interpreted as revealing capital misallocation 
caused by commission compensation structures. 
Importantly, not all capital markets participants can be taken by CEF 
IPOs.63 Recent empirical information regarding CEF holders confirms the 
impression that sophisticated investors do not purchase CEF shares in IPOs.64 
The evidence indicates that “institutional ownership in recent CEF IPOs is 
extremely low compared to operating company IPOs.”65 This means that, 
when more sophisticated institutional money managers evaluate investment 
opportunities, they generally pass on CEF IPOs.66 
Many explanations for CEF IPO sales point to purchasers’ lack of 
sophistication. Economists and other experts studying the products have 
theorized that the CEF IPO shares are bought by “noise traders, or ‘suckers,’ 
who are sufficiently optimistic to buy overpriced assets.”67 Some assert that 
                                                                                                                     
 60 See id. (“So, puzzle one: Why does anyone buy these funds when they are first 
issued?”); Charles M.C. Lee et al., Investor Sentiment and the Closed-End Fund Puzzle, 46 
J. FIN. 75, 75 (1991) (“Few problems in finance are as perplexing as the closed-end fund 
puzzle.”). 
 61 See Kathleen Weiss Hanley et al., The Marketing of Closed-End Fund IPOs: 
Evidence from Transactions Data, 5 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 127, 128 (1996) (“[I]n a 
rational expectations equilibrium, these [CEFs] should not get started at all.”). 
 62 One recent study revealed that when compared against CEF shares already on the 
market (seasoned shares), shares purchased during a CEF IPO underperformed seasoned 
shares by 8.52% after six months and 11.05% after one year. Diana Shao, Closed-End 
Fund IPOs: Sold Not Bought 1–3 (unpublished manuscript), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2652432 [https://perma.cc/24T3-XHG7] (last revised Mar. 17, 
2016). 
 63 See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency 
Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715, 725 (2003) (“[I]nstitutions 
hold only a very small percentage of closed-end mutual fund shares, leaving individual 
investors as the central clientele for this type of investment.”). 
 64 See Shao, supra note 62, at 18. 
 65 Id. at 3. 
 66 If an institutional money manager purchased and held CEF IPO shares, they would 
significantly underperform and likely attract less capital than their competitors. See Ronald 
J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors 
and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 893 (2013) (“For-
profit institutions like mutual funds have learned that investors follow relative performance 
and direct assets accordingly.”); see also LACK, supra note 36, at 27 (“It’s generally the 
dumb money that buys a CEF IPO at [issue price].”). 
 67 Lee et al., supra note 59, at 162 (noting that “[i]t helps to have a gimmick,” such as 
a famous asset manager). In the economics literature the term “noise trader” is frequently 
used as a euphemism for idiot. Lawrence Summers famously “began a paper on finance by 
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“[i]nvestors who wish to hold closed-end funds should never buy them at the 
IPO and the suggestion that they should by financial advisors is suspect.”68  
One anecdotal account from a financial advisor indicates that the 
intermediaries serving the retail market understand that purchasing CEF IPO 
shares is unwise: 
I once had a conversation with a Wall Street analyst at a very big firm 
about an upcoming CEF IPO. She had briefly forgotten about my background 
in finance and must have been thinking of me as another one of the patsies 
who willingly part with 6% of their investment for no good reason. She was 
attempting to get me interested in becoming a Day One investor, and I 
pointed out that many investors know to avoid CEF IPOs and wait for the 
secondary market price to buy 6% cheaper. Quickly recognizing her mistake, 
she breezily acknowledged the correctness of my view! Even though her job 
was to write research that would help persuade investors to overpay for the 
securities, she understood the fallacy in the message she was pushing.69 
C. Harms Caused by Conflicted Financial Advice 
The harms from conflicted financial advice extend far beyond the harms to 
individual investors. While these investors suffer subpar returns, the 
misallocation of social resources caused by conflicted investment advice 
causes widespread harm. 
1. Misdirected Financial Innovation and Amplified Systemic Risks 
The 2008 financial crisis clearly demonstrated that financial innovation 
has a dark side and that financial complexity may be used to exploit 
investors.70 In some instances, intermediaries  
can exploit the investors mistakes by creating financial instruments that pay 
off in the states that investors overweight and pay off less highly in the states 
                                                                                                                     
declaring: ‘THERE ARE IDIOTS. Look around.’” Paul Krugman, How Did Economists 
Get It So Wrong?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/magaz 
ine/06Economic-t.html [https://perma.cc/L9ND-Y3EH] (explaining that “the preferred 
term in the academic literature” for idiots is “noise traders”). 
 68 See Edward S. O’Neal, Closed-End Fund IPOs (June 29, 2007) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://www.slcg.com/pdf/workingpapers/Closed%20End%20Fund%20IPOs.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G8G3-BVLE]. 
 69 See LACK, supra note 36, at 27. 
 70 See Henry T.C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, “Pure Information,” and 
the SEC Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1647 (2012) (“There certainly is 
empirical evidence to suggest that financial product complexity can be used to exploit 
investors.”); Frank Partnoy, Historical Perspectives on the Financial Crisis: Ivar Kreuger, 
the Credit-Rating Agencies, and Two Theories About the Function, and Dysfunction, of 
Markets, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 431, 431–32 (2009) (explaining that “financial innovation 
often has a dark side” that can be driven by “disclosure gaps and misunderstandings”). 
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that investors underweight, leading the investors to value the new instruments 
more highly than they would if they understood financial markets and 
correctly evaluated information about probabilities of future events.71 
For example, the structured equity products Morgan Stanley markets to retail 
investors provide such abnormal negative returns that their purchase cannot be 
explained by any “benign reasons” and “most . . . investors would likely have 
been better off investing in non-interest bearing accounts.”72 Rather, their 
creation best indicates that sophisticated financial intermediaries profit by 
exploiting their counterparties’ relative lack of sophistication. 
Financial innovation designed to allow financial intermediaries to exploit 
conflicts of interest poses a particular danger to the financial system.73 For 
example, innovations that simply increase capital intermediation within the 
financial sector—such as Morgan Stanley’s structured equity products—may 
provide no significant social benefit and only amplify systemic risk.74 
Needless, complexity-increasing financial innovation contributes to systemic 
risk and fragility by increasing the length of intermediation chains.75 For 
example, a financial advisor might earn a rich incentive payment for 
transferring client assets to a fund of funds—an institutional intermediary that 
invests assets with other institutional intermediaries.76 Systemic risk increases 
with each additional intermediary added because every new intermediation 
node creates another opportunity for fragmentation.77  
This is not to say that financial innovation does not ever unlock benefits 
benefiting all parties. Frequently, it allows market participants to price and 
allocate risks in new, socially useful ways.78 Often, this process shifts risks to 
parties better able to bear them and allows new forms of diversification. As an 
example of a worthwhile financial innovation, consider the problem faced by 
                                                                                                                     
 71 Brian J. Henderson & Neil D. Pearson, The Dark Side of Financial Innovation: A 
Case Study of the Pricing of a Retail Financial Product, 100 J. FIN. ECON. 227, 228 (2011) 
(concluding that retail investors pay, on average, an 8% premium over fair market value for 
certain complex financial products). 
 72 Id. at 246. 
 73 See Hilary J. Allen, A New Philosophy for Financial Stability Regulation, 45 LOY. 
U. CHI. L.J. 173, 218–20 (2013) (explaining how complexity that merely moves capital 
within the financial sector and not to the development of real assets may threaten financial 
stability). 
 74 Id. at 220–21; see also Henderson & Pearson, supra note 71, at 229 (discussing 
Morgan Stanley’s Structured Equity Products). 
 75 See Judge, supra note 13, at 630 (“The lengthening of intermediation chains 
increases systemic risk through multiple mechanisms.”). 
 76 See id. at 608. 
 77 See Judge, supra note 14, at 657 (explaining how increased complexity generates 
systemic risk). 
 78 See Cathy Hwang & Benjamin P. Edwards, The Value of Uncertainty, 110 NW. U. 
L. REV. 283, 285–88 (2015) (describing the securitization process used to spread risk). 
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the artist David Bowie in 1997.79 He held a portfolio of ownership rights to 
royalties from music and film.80 While these royalties would likely pay Bowie 
substantial revenues over time, he wanted access today to the capital that these 
assets would generate over the tomorrows to come.81 The capital markets 
created a solution, dubbed Bowie Bonds, where David Bowie transferred his 
royalty rights to a trustee for a ten-year period of time.82 The expected revenue 
stream from David Bowie’s royalties allowed him to sell $55 million worth of 
bonds, allowing David Bowie to shift his consumption of the gains from his 
music into the present.83 
While David Bowie shifted consumption from the future to the present, 
the other party to the deal shifted its consumption from the present to the 
future.84 In buying the Bowie Bonds, the investor on the opposite side of the 
deal took funds it did not need today and used the Bowie Bonds to gain more 
funds in the future, spending $55 million dollars today for a greater amount 
over time.85 In these instances, financial innovation does good, unlocking 
benefits for all parties to a deal. 
2. Conflicts of Interest Increase Capital Costs 
Pervasive conflicts of interest raise the cost of capital both directly and 
indirectly, inhibiting economic growth.86 Conflicts of interest directly increase 
the cost of capital by forcing issuers to compete with each other to bias 
intermediaries. Consider the dilemma faced by an issuer, Company A, willing 
to offer 4% of the capital raised to intermediaries as compensation for their 
services selling the product to investors. If another issuer, Company B, offers 
6% of the capital raised as compensation to intermediaries that recommend it, 
Company A will need to either find another intermediary or increase the 
amount of capital it offers the intermediaries in exchange.87  
                                                                                                                     
 79 See Tommy Stubbington & Mike Bird, David Bowie: The Man Who Sold the 
World . . . and Bonds, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/david-
bowie-the-man-who-sold-the-worldand-bonds-1452542807 [https://perma.cc/NZM7-
PTCM]. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Stubbington & Bird, supra note 79. 
 86 The cost of capital influences economic growth because it determines how existing 
businesses and entrepreneurs will access capital to pursue development in the real 
economy. See Ralph K. Winter, Paying Lawyers, Empowering Prosecutors, and Protecting 
Managers: Raising the Cost of Capital in America, 42 DUKE L.J. 945, 945 (1993) (“The 
lower the cost of capital to a nation’s entrepreneurs, the more that will be purchased.”). 
 87 While it is possible that intermediaries could compete with each other on fees and 
lower the cost of capital by underbidding each other, the market for financial services does 
not appear particularly competitive. See Kathryn Judge, Fee Effects, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1517, 
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Conflicts of interest and exploitative practices may also raise the cost of 
capital by causing investors to distrust the securities markets.88 This may cause 
them to discount the amount they are willing to pay for securities to the extent 
that they lose faith in the judgment of the intermediary recommending a 
particular transaction.89 Of course, the existence of this discount depends on 
investors recognizing that conflicts of interest exist and responding to the 
conflict. While not all investors will appreciate or react to conflicts of interest, 
a significant enough portion may respond, effectively increasing the cost of 
capital. 
While this harm may be difficult to measure, distrust of financial 
institutions can drive significant macroeconomic harms and lead to panics.90 
In relationships where transaction partners trust each other’s integrity, it frees 
them “to act quickly and with confidence, again and again.”91 When an 
investor does not trust a financial advisor, it forces the expenditure of 
additional resources to assess the quality of a recommendation, further 
increasing the cost of capital.92 
3. Inefficient and Excessive Institutional Intermediation 
Conflicts of interest skew how institutional intermediaries gather investor 
capital. Many different institutional intermediaries—mutual funds, defined-
benefit pension plans, insurance companies, and others—manage retail 
investor capital.93 Indeed, for most retail investors, all their capital flows to the 
market through these institutional intermediaries.94 In every case, their 
                                                                                                                     
1545 (2013) (“[F]inancial intermediaries often operate in industries where there are a 
limited number of market participants and high barriers to entry, increasing the likelihood 
that they will be able to earn supra-competitive fees on some types of transactions.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 88 See Ziven Scott Birdwell, The Key Elements for Developing a Securities Market to 
Drive Economic Growth: A Roadmap for Emerging Markets, 39 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
535, 545 (2011) (“[A]buses . . . eat away at capital markets, destroy investor confidence, 
and increase the cost of capital.”). 
 89 Cf. Sung Hui Kim, Insider Trading as Private Corruption, 61 UCLA L. REV. 928, 
967 (2014) (“If investors come to see the securities markets as a rigged game—one that 
seems by design to systematically disadvantage ordinary investors—they could respond by 
discounting the amount that they are willing to pay for all securities, thereby raising the 
cost of capital.”). 
 90 See ANNA BERNASEK, THE ECONOMICS OF INTEGRITY 8 (2010) (“The result of all 
that integrity and trust unraveling was an economic contraction so profound that it affected 
every American together with vast populations around the world.”). 
 91 Id. at 11 (“Partners in trust are spared a multitude of worries—whether they’ll get 
paid, whether they’ll get what they think they’re paying for.”). 
 92 See id. 
 93 See Langevoort, supra note 28, at 1026 (discussing the rise of institutional 
intermediation). 
 94 See Anne Tucker, Retirement Revolution: Unmitigated Risks in the Defined 
Contribution Society, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 153, 177–78 (2013) (“While there are individual 
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continued existence as intermediaries depends on their ability to gather a pool 
of capital to manage—without assets, you cannot have an asset manager.  
Institutional intermediaries compete against each other on a variety of 
fronts within the market for institutional intermediation.95 While relative 
performance is certainly a factor, they also compete through ordinary 
marketing and by providing incentives for financial advisors to recommend 
their funds.96 Successful intermediaries grow larger as they attract more net 
capital inflows. 
Financial advisor incentives affect which institutional intermediaries 
receive capital.97 Before reaching the traditional securities markets, investor 
assets frequently pass through at least two layers of intermediation: (i) 
intermediation from a financial advisor selecting an institutional intermediary; 
and (ii) the institutional intermediary then investing the assets.98 Consider, for 
example, the recent SEC enforcement proceeding against Everhart Financial 
Group, an investment advisory firm, for skewing its recommendations.99 
Clients came to Everhart for assistance.100 Everhart “nearly always” steered 
non-retirement clients into mutual funds that routed fees back to Everhart’s 
owners.101 These conflicts of interest explain how many institutional 
intermediaries collect capital even though investing in their funds or at 
particular fee levels appears unwise.102  
                                                                                                                     
differences among many investors (i.e., priority, time horizon, risk tolerance, level of 
diversification), citizen shareholders have commonalities in how they enter the market, 
their investment in indirect funds, and a rational preference for long-term growth to fund 
future retirement.” (footnote omitted)). 
 95 The market for institutional intermediation is the market for the services of 
institutional intermediaries. Institutions that manage capital compete against each other. 
 96 See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 66, at 893 (“For-profit institutions like mutual 
funds have learned that investors follow relative performance and direct assets 
accordingly.”). For a description of different fees and expenses in the mutual fund space, 
see John A. Haslem, The “Many Faces” of Mutual Fund Revenue Sharing, J. INDEX 
INVESTING, Winter 2014, at 59, 59–60, and Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 
supra note 1. 
 97 See Christoffersen et al., supra note 5, at 229. 
 98 In some instances, there may be additional layers of intermediation if the 
institutional intermediary invests the assets gathered with other intermediaries. One 
example of this dynamic would be intermediaries known as funds of funds—an investment 
fund that invests in a variety of other investment funds. 
 99 Everhart Fin. Grp., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 76897, 2016 WL 159329, at 
*2 (Jan. 14, 2016). 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Illustrating the powerful draw of conflicted payments, Everhart collected these fees 
even though the Investment Advisers Act required it “to seek the most favorable terms 
reasonably available under the circumstances” when executing client transactions. See 
Fidelity Mgmt. & Research Co., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2713, 2008 WL 
598424, at *6 (Mar. 5, 2008) (citing Interpretative Release Concerning the Scope of 
Section 28(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
23170, 51 Fed. Reg. 16004 (Apr. 23, 1986)). 
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The current market for institutional intermediation is best explained by 
financial advisor preferences, not investor preferences.103 In the idealized 
world of economic theory, one populated by perfectly rational, well-informed 
and high-functioning persons with the time to critically consider the 
differences between institutional intermediaries, the market for institutional 
intermediation would look strikingly different.104 Institutional intermediaries 
would compete by undercutting their rivals and lowering costs—a form of 
competition benefiting investors. Rational investors would select the firms that 
offered them the best results. In theory, this seemingly creates a powerful 
incentive for some entrepreneur to provide better advice to retail investors for 
a reasonable fee. If the upstart providing superior advice secured large profits 
from serving the retail market, we would expect others to follow and for 
competition to drive prices down still further to an efficient equilibrium point.  
A similar dynamic exists for assets within employer-sponsored, defined-
contribution plans.105 While the assets funneled to many mutual funds 
ultimately belong to employee-investors, the employer or the plan 
administrator actually determines whether the plan will offer a particular 
fund.106 Given this reality, funds may have stronger interest in pleasing the 
employer or plan administrator than the underlying investors.107  
Competition among financial intermediaries has not yet solved this 
problem and seems unlikely to do so. Consider, for example, the proliferation 
of funds tracking the S&P 500.108 Many of these funds charge significantly 
different fees for tracking the same index, and many investors purchase the 
higher-fee funds—a reality that appears inconsistent with a model of the world 
that assumes investors are acting in ways that will maximize their returns.109 
This is particularly puzzling because the only real difference between the 
funds is the fees.110 Higher-fee index funds will always lose to lower-fee index 
funds if they track the same index. Even persons we would expect to exhibit 
                                                                                                                     
 103 Often, commentators describe the market for mutual funds without discussing the 
financial advisors’ incentives. See Christoffersen et al., supra note 5, at 201 (“The decision 
to invest in a mutual fund is usually traced to the investor’s preferences and information.”). 
 104 At the least, this market would be informationally and fundamentally efficient—the 
price paid for institutional intermediaries would fairly reflect the value delivered. 
 105 See Tucker, supra note 28, at 121–22. 
 106 Id. at 112. 
 107 Id. at 123. 
 108 See Jacob Hale Russell, The Separation of Intelligence and Control: Retirement 
Savings and the Limits of Soft Paternalism, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 35, 62–63 (2015) 
(discussing the puzzling fee differential between index funds). 
 109 See, e.g., Edwin J. Elton et al., Are Investors Rational? Choices Among Index 
Funds, 59 J. FIN. 261, 286 (2004) (noting that while minor differences exist, the funds all 
advertise that they track the same indexes). 
 110 Id. at 261. 
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financial sophistication—Wharton MBA students—often make the same 
mistake and do not minimize fees.111  
The institutional intermediaries offering these higher-fee index funds 
know that they are not in the best interests of the persons that purchase them 
but they do so anyway because financial advisors will recommend them to 
their clients.112 For example, purchasing Morgan Stanley’s high-fee index 
fund instead of a lower-fee index fund simply misallocates capital and diverts 
more fees to Morgan Stanley. In this sense, the providers of high-fee index 
funds appear to be profiting by presenting opportunities for retail investors to 
buy something more aligned with the seller’s interest than the investor’s. But 
the issuers of these high-fee index funds are not the only ones at work here—
many of these higher fee index funds charge high fees to kick back a portion 
of those fees to the financial advisors that recommend them.113 
Since institutional intermediaries often lack direct relationships with 
investors, they compete through financial advisors, and employer-sponsored 
retirement plans.114 Unsurprisingly, to access the pool of retail capital, 
institutional intermediaries offer products that compensate financial advisors 
for recommending these products to their clients.115 While funds adopting 
these bias-inducing structures tend to underperform in terms of gains to their 
investors, they gain additional net capital inflows—increasing returns to the 
asset manager because the asset manager’s compensation often derives from 
the size of the asset pool managed, not its performance.116  
Because of the skewed incentives of financial intermediaries, the market 
for institutional intermediation is both informationally and fundamentally 
inefficient. In informationally efficient markets, it is not possible to lay out “a 
trading rule that systematically outperforms the market (net of transaction 
costs) absent possession of inside information.”117 Yet it is possible to lay out 
a trading rule to systematically outperform in the market for institutional 
intermediation. The rule is straightforward and well-known—buy a broadly 
diversified, low-cost index fund.118 Put differently, if the market for 
                                                                                                                     
 111 James J. Choi et al., Why Does the Law of One Price Fail? An Experiment on Index 
Mutual Funds, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1405, 1407, 1429–30 (2010). 
 112 Russell, supra note 108, at 64–65. 
 113 Id. at 57 (explaining that people pick high-fee funds because of an “advice-giver 
who is financially incentivized through (entirely legal) direct or indirect kickbacks”). 
 114 See Donald C. Langevoort, Chasing the Greased Pig Down Wall Street: A 
Gatekeeper’s Guide to the Psychology, Culture, and Ethics of Financial Risk Taking, 96 
CORNELL L. REV. 1209, 1240 (2011); Tucker, supra note 28, at 121–22. 
 115 See Christoffersen et al., supra note 5, at 204 (“New investment increases with the 
load paid to the broker, in particular when the brokers are unaffiliated . . . .”). 
 116 Id. 
 117 See Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, the Crash, and the Fraud on the 
Market Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 907, 913 (1989). 
 118 See Russell, supra note 108, at 59 n.102 (“[T]here is no debate over indexing 
versus active management.”); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common 
Ground? Reflections on the Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational 
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institutional intermediation were informationally efficient, it would not be 
possible to outperform this market by picking the intermediaries that offer 
low-cost passive investing strategies.119  
This inefficiency persists because the market for institutional 
intermediation does not function like the stock market. Unlike identifiable 
inefficiencies in the stock market, potential arbitrageurs in the institutional 
intermediation market do not have access to easy mechanisms to profit off the 
inefficiency. In the stock market, one winning strategy would be to identify 
reliable losers—stocks that are likely to suffer abnormal negative returns. By 
shorting these stocks and betting on their predictable failure, an investor could 
book substantial profits. In the market for institutional intermediaries, picking 
losers is easy—as a group, the funds that charge high fees for active 
management are going to suffer relative underperformance.120 Yet, investors 
cannot usually short mutual funds the same way they would short stocks to 
drive the price down.121 When an investor sells a share of a traditional open-
end mutual fund, the mutual fund itself buys the share back—the market price 
is set by the net asset value of the fund, not by the market’s demand for the 
fund.122 
An informationally and fundamentally efficient market for institutional 
intermediation would look significantly different than the current overly 
dispersed and actively managed landscape. At the least, reducing conflicts of 
interest should cause more assets to flow from active to passive 
management.123 Ideally, this would continue until it would no longer be true, 
as a general rule, that passive investing will outperform active investing. This 
consolidation process would likely result in passive intermediaries holding 
substantially more assets than they do now.  
                                                                                                                     
System of Corporate Governance, 33 J. CORP. L. 1, 4 (2007) (“If you are acting with the 
most rationality, you will invest in index funds, which hold broad baskets of securities and 
bonds reflecting the opportunities and risks faced by the market, recognizing that it is 
nearly impossible to pursue an active trading strategy that will beat the market over time.”). 
 119 The market for institutional intermediation is not efficient. See Tucker, supra note 
28, at 137 (“Criticisms that the mutual fund market is inefficient point to the wide variety 
of fees charged for substantially similar services and information asymmetries among 
securities consumers facilitating the persistence of high fees despite the detrimental impact 
of returns.” (footnote omitted)). 
 120 See Russell, supra note 108, at 59 n.102 (likening the debate over active versus 
passive investing to the debate over climate change because the debate persists even though 
the relative underperformance of active management has been conclusively established for 
decades). 
 121 Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Protecting Consumer Investors by Facilitating 
“Improved Performance” Competition, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 9–16 (discussing barriers 
to shorting mutual funds). 
 122 For a description of the difference between traditional open-end mutual funds and 
closed-end mutual funds, see Daniel S. Alterbaum, Control Share Acts, Closed-End Funds, 
and the Battle for Corporate Control, 17 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 310, 316–17 (2012). 
 123 See BURKE & HUNG, supra note 15, at 28 (reporting that after the United Kingdom 
banned retail commissions, “flows into index funds increased substantially”). 
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4. Excessive Speculative Trading 
The high volume of speculative trading has long seemed puzzling because 
“stock trading is a zero-sum game.”124 While it is possible for an individual to 
make trading profits by buying “winning” stocks from others, each transaction 
comes at a cost—brokerage commissions and research and analysis costs.125 
Unsurprisingly, the more a person trades, the more money they tend to lose.126 
Similarly, actively managed institutional intermediaries tend to 
underperform the market.127 This raises the obvious question—why do they 
continue actively managing funds? The asset manager’s own interests may 
best explain the activity.128 Active trading allows an asset manager to justify 
its fees without necessarily delivering value. Of course, because many asset 
managers know that they will also be evaluated by their relative performance 
against other funds or some market benchmark, many may engage in a 
practice known as closet-indexing.129 These closeted funds mimic an index by 
simply buying largely the same stocks as the index and uselessly trading 
within the diversified portfolio.130 Closet-indexing protects the asset manager 
from exhibiting significant relative underperformance—the closet index will 
do about the same as the index, less the fees and expenses collected by the 
intermediaries.131 These practices simply extract funds from investors without 
delivering any social benefits. In this instance, the deceptive practice—closet-
indexing—contributes to the excessive volume of trading. 
                                                                                                                     
 124 See Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market 
Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611, 622 (1995) (describing the puzzle 
of speculative trading). 
 125 See id. 
 126 See generally Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Trading Is Hazardous to Your 
Wealth: The Common Stock Investment Performance of Individual Investors, 55 J. FIN. 773 
(2000) (showing that returns decline with trading activity). 
 127 Stout, supra note 124, at 622–64, 664 nn.167–68. 
 128 See Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate 
Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265, 301 (2012) (“One explanation is that livelihoods depend 
on trading.”); Tucker, supra note 94, at 182 (explaining that investor time horizons 
“conflict with investment horizons of mutual fund managers where the models of 
performance evaluation and compensation drive short-term time horizons at the funds”). 
 129 See Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1961, 2018 (2010) (describing closet-indexing). 
 130 Id. 
 131 See K.J. Martijn Cremers & Quinn Curtis, Do Mutual Fund Investors Get What 
They Pay For? Securities Law and Closet Index Funds, 11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 31, 45–46 
(2016) (explaining that closet-indexing allows a risk-adverse manager to avoid 
significantly underperforming a benchmark). 
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5. Toxic Business Cultures 
It is no secret that financial intermediation is known for an abnormally 
high frequency of manipulative and deceptive behavior.132 This may also be 
viewed as a problem with corporate culture in the financial services 
industry.133 To address this problem, policymakers have begun to focus on 
altering the corporate and business cultures of intermediaries in the aftermath 
of the 2008 financial crisis.134 For example, FINRA, the self-regulatory 
organization for broker-dealer firms, recently declared its intention to 
scrutinize culture at financial institutions, going as far as defining culture “as 
firm norms—those practices and behaviors within the workplace that have a 
‘profound influence’ on” how institutions manage their business and deal with 
conflicts.135  
Many cultural problems of financial firms may flow from conflicts of 
interest in the compensation structures for financial advisors.136 Persons that 
                                                                                                                     
 132 See ROBERT J. SHILLER, FINANCE AND THE GOOD SOCIETY 159 (2012) (“Certain 
finance-related fields are among those that often put people in positions offering more than 
the usual temptation to be manipulative or less than honest.”); see also KAY, supra note 18, 
at 246 (“Finance is an especially attractive field for fraudsters . . . .”). 
 133 For a definition of corporate culture, see Corporate Culture, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014), which says it is “[a] prevalent attitude or atmosphere created 
by a company’s rules, policies, practices (esp. hiring practices), and communications from 
management, such as those touching on compliance or noncompliance with legal 
requirements.” 
 134 See Nizan Geslevich Packin & Benjamin P. Edwards, Regulating Culture: 
Improving Corporate Governance with Anti-Arbitration Provisions for Whistleblowers, 58 
WM. & MARY L. REV. ONLINE 41, 45–47 (2016), http://wmlawreview.org/sites/default/files 
/Packin%20%26%20Edwards-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5G5-WJCY] (discussing efforts 
to improve corporate cultures). 
 135 See Megan Leonhardt, FINRA to Scrutinize Firm Culture, WEALTH MGMT.COM 
(Jan. 8, 2016), http://wealthmanagement.com/regulation-compliance/finra-scrutinize-firm-
culture [https://perma.cc/VC69-BS6M]. Other regulators adopting a focus on culture 
include, William C. Dudley, president and chief executive officer of the New York Federal 
Reserve, who called on banks to reform their cultures, adding that regulators might move 
to break up banks if behavior patterns did not change. William C. Dudley, President & 
Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Opening Remarks at Reforming Culture 
and Behavior in the Financial Services Industry: Workshop on Progress and Challenges 
(Nov. 5, 2015) (transcript available at https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2 
015/dud151105 [https://perma.cc/966J-9H75]). Similarly, the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission’s Commissioner Sharon Bowen stated in 2015 that “[w]e have a culture 
problem in finance at present,” and pushed for reform. Sharon Y. Bowen, Comm’r, U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Keynote Speech Before the Quadrilateral Meeting 
at the European Central Bank in Frankfurt, Germany (June 24, 2015) (transcript available 
at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opabowen-5 [https://perm 
a.cc/ZM99-ATBF]). 
 136 See Hilary J. Allen, The Pathologies of Banking Business as Usual, 17 U. PA. J. 
BUS. L. 861, 861–62 (2015) (“The trouble, instead, is that the structural conditions of the 
financial industry have fostered certain cultural norms.”); Donald C. Langevoort, 
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do not perform well within this competitive environment will not remain with 
financial intermediaries—a market force that drives the development of firm 
culture. 
Consider, for example, the employment equilibrium within a broker-dealer 
firm. The firm hires two different brokers, say Afra and Betsy, with two 
different approaches to their clients. Afra takes the strictly ethical approach 
and only recommends transactions if she believes them to be in her customer’s 
best interest. Betsy takes a more flexible approach and simply sells her client 
the highest commission product her supervisor deems suitable.137 At the end 
of the first quarter, firm managers will compare how much revenue Afra 
generated for the firm to the revenue generated by Betsy. After this meeting, 
firm managers will likely ask Afra to either produce more or leave the firm. If 
Afra leaves the firm, Betsy will take over Afra’s accounts.138 
The dynamics giving rise to this equilibrium may explain the amount of 
unethical behavior swirling through the financial services industry. Indeed, 
one recent survey found that 23% of financial services employees “believe it is 
likely that fellow employees have engaged in illegal or unethical activity in 
order to gain an advantage over competitors or others at the company.”139 
When asked whether “industry professionals have to engage in illegal or 
unethical activity in order to be successful,” nearly one in five said yes.140  
These survey numbers likely understate the extent of the problem. Few 
people would admit to themselves that they exploit their customers. Instead, 
they may rationalize their conduct or gradually become desensitized as they 
                                                                                                                     
Psychological Perspectives on the Fiduciary Business, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 995, 998 (2011) 
(“Nor, however, is it likely that this setting favors the naturally honest, candid fiduciary.”). 
 137 Of course, the market imposes some discipline on an overly manipulative retail 
intermediary. So long as the retail investor does not attribute underperformance to the retail 
intermediary’s advice or believe that the retail intermediary has exploited him, the 
relationship will likely continue. 
 138 For a description of this dynamic in practice, see BROWN, supra note 31, at 23, 
which states that “[f]or the broker, this equation hits a bit closer to home: ‘Doing more 
transactions means that I keep my job. It also means that over time I add the assets of other 
brokers who are fired for doing too few transactions.’” See also Langevoort, supra note 
136, at 1001 (“[T]oo great a tendency to adhere to social norms of honesty and respect 
interferes with sales production.”). 
 139 ANN TENBRUNSEL & JORDAN THOMAS, UNIV. OF NOTRE DAME, THE STREET, THE 
BULL AND THE CRISIS: A SURVEY OF THE US & UK FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY 4 (May 
2015), www.secwhistlebloweradvocate.com/LiteratureRetrieve.aspx?ID=224757 [https://p 
erma.cc/QZ3G-2JJ4]. 
 140 Id. at 6. 
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accept the norms of the environment.141 This environment will tend to contain 
persons that are somewhat Machiavellian and “adept at self-deception.”142 
This dynamic may affect some financial services firms more than others. 
Recent studies have found that certain financial services firms hire and employ 
financial advisors with abnormally high numbers of customer complaints or 
other indicia of possible misconduct.143 For example, even though only about 
7% of financial advisors have indicia of possible misconduct on their records, 
about 20% of the financial advisors employed by Oppenheimer & Co., have 
disclosures on their records.144 A similar study considered a broader set of data 
and found that the financial advisors at six other firms had even higher rates of 
misconduct indicia.145 Firms with particularly high concentrations of brokers 
with indicia of possible misconduct on their records may have different firm-
specific cultures than other financial services firms and may behave 
differently. For example, one recent study found that analysts at firms with 
higher numbers of FINRA violations issued less accurate earnings forecasts.146  
6. Manipulative Sales Practices 
Conflicts of interest also drive manipulative sales practices. Recent work 
on the economics of manipulation and deception provides a theoretical 
framework for thinking about these issues.147 Sensible reforms must address 
compensation structures that reward financial advisors for influencing retail 
customers to act against their own interests, causing harms within the financial 
sector and the real economy.148 Cass Sunstein recently summarized work on 
                                                                                                                     
 141 See Langevoort, supra note 114, at 1240 (“Those who get all the way to the top are 
often quite gifted at rationalization and dissembling—a high Machiavellian style—carrying 
very little of the heavy baggage of moral anxiety.”); Langevoort, supra note 136, at 1001 
(“Firms have a large number of tools at their disposal to make rationalizations easy and 
convenient.”). 
 142 Langevoort, supra note 136, at 1001. 
 143 Mark Egan et al., The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct 27 (Mar. 1, 2016) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2739170 [https://perma.cc/XC23-
L8TG]. 
 144 Id. at 1. 
 145 Craig McCann et al., How Widespread and Predictable Is Stock Broker 
Misconduct? 1, 31 (Apr. 22, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=276 
8942 [https://perma.cc/Q6K8-QALC] (“These six firms – Aegis Capital, Summit 
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 146 Joseph Pacelli, Integrity Culture and Analyst Forecast Quality 1 (Kelley Sch. of 
Bus., Research Paper No. 15-57, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2641041 [https://perma.cc 
/A6KV-WV98]. 
 147 See generally GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, PHISHING FOR PHOOLS: 
THE ECONOMICS OF MANIPULATION & DECEPTION (2015). 
 148 Cf. id. at 24 (citing Carl Shapiro, Consumer Information, Product Quality, and 
Seller Reputation, 13 BELL J. ECON. 20 (1982)).  
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the economics of manipulation and deception as follows: “companies exploit 
human weaknesses not necessarily because they are malicious or venal, but 
because the market makes them do it. Those who fail to exploit people will 
lose out to those who do.”149 
The economics of manipulation and deception explain that a free market 
also leaves market participants free to exploit the psychological and 
informational weaknesses of others.150 In any situation where abnormal profits 
may be secured by preying on these weaknesses, the default expectation 
should be that manipulation and deception will occur.151  
Businesses that do not take advantage of these opportunities to exploit 
human weaknesses may find themselves at a disadvantage or go out of 
existence. Consider casinos for example. Slot machines are addictive by 
design, but a losing bet for the player.152 These machines are major revenue 
sources for casinos and are known to cause compulsive addictions in many 
people.153 If a casino opted against installing the latest machines that most 
efficiently and sustainably separate players from their money, it would 
gradually lose market share and suffer lower revenues than its competitors 
using newer, more addictive models. If the casino were publicly traded, it 
might even face takeover bids from outsiders seeking to more profitably 
monetize the casino floor for stockholders.  
Given this incentive and accompanying pressure, some level of 
manipulation and deception should always be expected. Market participants 
may use different mechanisms to induce consumers to make unwise decisions. 
In the most egregious instances, this takes the form of outright fraud where an 
intermediary simply presents “information that is intentionally crafted to 
mislead.”154 Psychological techniques may also be used to induce retail 
investors to make decisions more in the interest of a financial advisor than 
                                                                                                                     
 149 Cass R. Sunstein, Why Free Markets Make Fools of Us, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Oct. 22, 
2015), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/10/22/why-free-markets-make-fools-us/ 
[https://perma.cc/DG87-TBXA] (book review). 
 150 See AKERLOF & SHILLER, supra note 147, at 1. 
 151 Id. at 170 (challenging the idea that “revealed preferences” should be viewed as the 
norm). 
 152 See generally NATASHA DOW SCHÜLL, ADDICTION BY DESIGN: MACHINE 
GAMBLING IN LAS VEGAS (2012) (describing slot machines). 
 153 Id. 
 154 AKERLOF & SHILLER, supra note 147, at xi. The securities laws clearly prohibit 
outright, intentional fraudulent statements. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 
(1976) (limiting actions under Rule 10b-5 to instances involving fraudulent intent). 
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their own.155 One particularly crude approach involves agitating retail 
customers so that their emotions override their common sense.156  
Similarly, the brokerage industry’s infamous “Straight Line” sales pitch is 
calculated to generate impulsive purchases.157 When brokers learn the pitch, 
they are taught to envision themselves “chasing a prospective customer down 
a hallway” filled with doors.158 Each door represents an excuse that a client 
might make to say no to a trade.159 The pitch arms financial advisors with 
rebuttals to close the doors through which a client might escape, herding the 
client in a straight line toward a sale.160 For example, if a male client indicates 
that he would like to speak with his wife before buying, the financial advisor 
will deliver calculated arguments “in the most mocking and emasculating tone 
that could be employed without going over the line.”161  
In the alternative, financial advisors may exploit some social heuristic that 
leads retail investors to misperceive reality and place too much trust in a 
financial advisor.162 One common way to induce action from a prospective 
client is by exploiting human reciprocity norms. Investors may incur a feeling 
of obligation if they accept something from a financial advisor. The 
widespread norm of repaying even small favors is a psychological 
vulnerability manipulative sales practices exploit because a “small initial favor 
can produce a sense of obligation to agree to a substantially larger return 
favor.”163  
Financial advisors and institutional intermediaries have exploited the 
reciprocity dynamic and psychological dynamics with “‘free lunch’ 
seminars.”164 Often, these seminars have offered a free meal plus the promise 
                                                                                                                     
 155 See Langevoort, supra note 136, at 997–98 (“The very moment the ‘fiduciary’ 
becomes interested in consumer psychology, he or she starts down a slippery slope, away 
from the ethical ideals of candor and respect for the integrity of the client and toward the 
objectification of the client as an excitable bundle of wants, hopes, and fears.”). 
 156 In one annuity sales training seminar, participants were told to “[t]oss hand 
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and greed.” Ellen E. Schultz & Jeff D. Opdyke, At Annuity University, Agents Learn How 
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 157 See BROWN, supra note 31, at 174 (“The Straight Line is impulse selling at its most 
aggressive . . . .”). 
 158 Id. at 175–76.  
 159 Id. at 176. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. at 200. 
 162 AKERLOF & SHILLER, supra note 147, at xi.  
 163 ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 33 (4th ed. 2001). 
 164 See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N ET AL., PROTECTING SENIOR INVESTORS: REPORT OF 
EXAMINATIONS OF SECURITIES FIRMS PROVIDING “FREE LUNCH” SALES SEMINARS 11 (Sept. 
2007), http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/seniors/freelunchreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Q4E-
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of “‘free’ advice by ‘experts.’”165 When the SEC reviewed these seminars, it 
found that, while many of them were advertised as “educational,” they were all 
designed to do one thing—sell products.166 In many instances, seminar 
attendees were not aware that the seminar itself may have been paid for by an 
insurance company or mutual fund under the expectation that the financial 
advisor would sell their products.167 The typical securities law response—
requiring more publicly filed disclosure from issuers168—seems unlikely to 
diminish the efficacy of the reciprocity effect. 
Financial intermediaries may also induce unwise decisions by exploiting 
“investors’ behavioral quirks” and misperceptions about the world.169 
Behavioral economists have identified a series of different cognitive biases 
and ways in which people are predictably irrational.170 For example, some 
investors may simply make a decision about whether to invest by how 
confident their financial advisor appears to be.171 This confidence heuristic 
may lead them to be too willing to trust overconfident advisors.  
A significant level of manipulation and deception may persist because 
financial advisors will only rarely face any consequence for recommending 
that their retail clients purchase financial products that imperfectly serve their 
needs.172 For skewed advice to affect a financial advisor’s reputation, two 
things must occur: (i) the retail client must realize that the financial advisor 
made a recommendation that was not in her best interest; and (ii) the retail 
                                                                                                                     
VBH5] (“Some ads and mailers used tactics to scare seniors into thinking that they might 
not be using the right investment professional, or to question their current investments.”). 
 165 Id. at 3. 
 166 Id. at 11. 
 167 Id. at 4–5. 
 168 See Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its 
Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 418 (2003) (“Securities 
regulation is motivated, in large part, by the assumption that more information is better 
than less. Perhaps this is no surprise since the SEC’s chief regulatory tool is to require 
companies to disclose more.”). 
 169 Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. 
REV. 1, 18 (2003). 
 170 See Alan Schwartz, Regulating for Rationality, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1390 (2015) 
(discussing how many different, and possibly offsetting, cognitive biases may be in play 
whenever a person makes a decision). 
 171 Sunita Sah et al., Cheap Talk and Credibility: The Consequences of Confidence and 
Accuracy on Advisor Credibility and Persuasiveness, 121 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & 
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 246, 254 (2013) (showing that projecting excessive confidence 
can trigger investor reliance). 
 172 For a discussion illustrating the vital importance of reputation in a different 
economic context, see Jamila Jefferson-Jones, A Good Name: Applying Regulatory Takings 
Analysis to Reputational Damage Caused by Criminal History, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 497, 
527 (2013). 
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client must somehow broadcast that discovery to other retail clients that use 
the financial advisor.173  
For retail investors, both mechanisms for reputational consequences to 
function appear inhibited. Retail clients may be particularly unlikely to 
recognize when they have been bamboozled into buying a high-fee product 
because they are often financially illiterate.174 Even if a retail investor 
becomes dissatisfied and brings an arbitration proceeding against a financial 
advisor, the financial advisor will often be able to remove the complaint from 
public records, further inhibiting the reputation consequence.175 One recent 
study found that, for cases settled between mid-May 2009 and the end of 2011, 
requests to expunge customer complaints from public records were granted 
96.9% of the time.176 In this market, reputation does not appear to function as 
an effective constraint because retail investors do not detect exploitation or 
broadcast their findings effectively. 
III. ALIGN INCENTIVES TO IMPROVE CAPITAL ALLOCATION 
Banning commission compensation for personalized financial advice will 
better align financial advisor incentives with their clients’ interest and improve 
capital allocation.177 Other nations with well-developed financial sectors, 
including Australia and the United Kingdom, have already adopted this 
approach, sharply limiting commission compensation in connection with the 
provision of personalized investment advice to retail customers.178 This Part 
                                                                                                                     
 173 See Judge, supra note 87, at 1550 (describing the two reputation feedback channels 
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 178 See Francis J. Facciolo, Symposium Introduction: Revolution in the Regulation of 
Financial Advice: The U.S., the U.K. and Australia, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 297, 299 (2013) 
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presents the proposal to ban commissions and sales incentives in connection 
with the provision of personalized investment advice.  
A. The Proposal 
Congress should replace the current patchwork regulatory structures for 
financial advisors and simply ban commission-based compensation for 
financial advisors providing personalized financial advice.179 As explained 
above, commission compensation should be banned because it erodes both 
investors’ savings and macroeconomic stability.  
While the proposal would restructure the U.S. financial services model, 
other nations have already enacted similar reforms to put market forces to 
work for consumers.180 When the United Kingdom embraced this approach, it 
did so “to establish remuneration arrangements that allow competitive forces 
to work in favor of consumers.”181 Similarly, Australia banned commissions 
because of “mis-selling scandals in which sales targets incentivized financial 
advisers to persuade clients to switch out of safe term deposit accounts into 
funds that delivered banks increased compensation.”182  
Available evidence indicates that banning this most corrosive form of 
compensation will improve capital allocation.183 After the United Kingdom 
banned commission compensation in connection with the provision of 
personalized investment advice to retail customers, capital flows shifted with a 
substantial increase in funds flowing into index funds.184 
                                                                                                                     
(“The United Kingdom and Australia have also been pursuing radical reforms of the 
regulation of financial advice given to retail customers. The purpose of these reforms is to 
restrict compensation practices for investment advisers that might influence the advice that 
they give to retail customers because of their compensation arrangements with financial 
product producers.”); Gerard McMeel, International Issues in the Regulation of Financial 
Advice: A United Kingdom Perspective—The Retail Distribution Review and the Ban on 
Commission Payments to Financial Intermediaries, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 595, 596 (2013) 
(explaining that the United Kingdom has outright banned “payments by product providers” 
to financial advisors providing investment advice to retail customers); Victoria Stace, New 
Zealand’s Financial Adviser Regulation: Falling Behind in the Wake of Overseas Reforms, 
26 N.Z.U. L. REV. 869, 870 (2015) (“Both the United Kingdom and Australia have rules 
that, broadly speaking, prohibit the receipt of commissions in relation to advice given to 
retail clients.”). 
 179 While we did not discuss the impact of conflicted advice on capital allocation, 
Christine Lazaro and I previously called for compensation reform. See Lazaro & Edwards, 
supra note 9, at 87–88. 
 180 BURKE & HUNG, supra note 15, at 9–12. 
 181 Id. at 9 (emphasis omitted) (describing reforms in the United Kingdom). 
 182 Id. at 12. 
 183 Id. at 31. 
 184 Id. The shift should also significantly improve industry culture by freeing financial 
advisors from the current forced competition in an environment favoring manipulation and 
deception. 
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This, of course, will require a move to different forms of payment for 
financial advisors. While any payment structure will create some conflict of 
interest, alternatives are unlikely to cause the same sorts of harms as 
commission-driven financial advice. There are at least three different payment 
models that would avoid the capital misallocation caused by commission-
driven advice: (i) fixed, upfront fees; (ii) hourly fees; or (iii) fees calculated as 
a percentage of assets under management for ongoing management and 
oversight services.185 None of these compensation structures creates a 
financial incentive to recommend one product over another.186 
Upfront or hourly fees provide the most transparent solutions for retail 
investors.187 With these compensation structures, the investors are most likely 
to understand that they are paying for services.188 Hourly fees directly tie 
compensation received to the amount of work performed.189 Retail investors 
receiving bills for time spent on their behalf may be more able to effectively 
monitor their financial advisors than retail investors paying through 
commissions embedded inside complex products.190  
Fees calculated from a percentage of assets under management do create 
conflicts of their own, although not the kind that skew capital allocation. A 
financial advisor compensated in this way may simply seek to gather a 
sizeable pool of assets to manage without delivering much value. To improve 
the ability of investors to monitor the amount of fees collected by financial 
advisors under this compensation structure, Congress should require that 
financial advisors give their clients an annual statement, clearly showing the 
amount of fees collected for advisory services. To ensure that retail investors 
understand the structure, financial advisors should be required to secure 
consent for this structure on an annual basis.191 
While a general ban on commission compensation will do much good, it 
may be desirable to allow certain investors to opt in to receiving commission-
driven sales pitches. One possibility may be to only allow accredited and 
institutional investors to opt in to receiving commission-driven sales pitches. 
Under section 3(a) of the Securities Act, accredited investors include, among 
                                                                                                                     
 185 Daisy Maxey, How to Pay Your Financial Adviser, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 12, 
2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204554204577024152103830414 
[https://perma.cc/W84M-JC6T]. 
 186 To be sure, banning commission compensation would not be a silver bullet solving 
all problems. It would simply shift the industry to less troubling forms of compensation. Id. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. 
 189 Hourly compensation is not without its drawbacks. It creates an incentive to work 
inefficiently because spending more time on a project results in increased revenues. See 
Cathy Hwang, Unbundled Bargains: Multi-Agreement Dealmaking in Complex Mergers 
and Acquisitions, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1403, 1436 (2016) (discussing concern that hourly 
billing leads to an incentive to work inefficiently). 
 190 Maxey, supra note 185. 
 191 While disclosure will not solve every problem, well-tailored disclosures may 
potentiate more effective monitoring. 
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others, banks, investment companies, and persons with a net worth exceeding 
$1 million (excluding the value of a primary residence) or with income 
exceeding $200,000 in each of the two most recent years.192 To ensure that the 
recipient of a pitch understands that she is receiving a commission-driven sales 
pitch, a financial advisor making such a pitch might be required to secure 
written client consent before making each pitch. 
While commission compensation structures will likely lead to some capital 
misallocation, the effect seems unlikely to be as large outside of the retail 
market.193 Retail investors require special treatment because they are the least 
sophisticated and the least able to protect their own interests.194  
Critics may contend that this would cause investors either to pay more for 
advice or not receive it at all. Even if these were both true, it might yield better 
outcomes. For example, an investor paying 1% of assets under management to 
an advisor would likely make better capital allocation decisions—perhaps 
buying publicly traded REITs instead of non-traded REITs. While the cost of 
the advice might be higher, the gains derived from selecting a superior asset 
would outweigh the marginally higher cost and improve economy-wide capital 
allocation. 
B. Impact on Current Advisors 
For the proposal to work, Congress must pass legislation that covers all 
persons receiving compensation in exchange for providing personalized 
investment advice because such a broad variety of financial advisors now 
directly or indirectly sell personalized financial advice to the retail market.195 
Adding to the complexity, policymakers concerned with addressing the 
problem face a Gordian knot of overlapping regulatory structures. The person 
providing personalized investment advice may be a stockbroker, registered 
investment advisor, insurance salesperson, confidence artist, lawyer, some 
other financial professional or some combination of the foregoing.196 In many 
instances, the financial advisor will have no legal obligation to put the 
                                                                                                                     
 192 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2016). 
 193 See OFFICE OF INV’R EDUC. & ADVOCACY, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY 
REGARDING FINANCIAL LITERACY AMONG INVESTORS iii (2012) [hereinafter SEC, 
FINANCIAL LITERACY STUDY], http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/917-financial-
literacy-study-part1.pdf [https://perma.cc/4UXW-P9QX] (extensively documenting 
widespread financial illiteracy). 
 194 Id. at viii. 
 195 Rules and Resources, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/Investors/ToolsCalculators/Pro 
fessionalDesignations/RulesandResources/ [https://perma.cc/TY7F-FPEH] (“[B]e aware 
that Financial Analyst, Financial Adviser (Advisor), Financial Consultant, Financial 
Planner, Investment Consultant or Wealth Manager are generic terms or job titles, and may 
be used by investment professionals who may not hold any specific credential.”). 
 196 See id. 
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investors’ interests before her own.197 While not much research has been done 
on the differences in outcomes under different regimes, one recent study found 
that the kind of advice investors receive may be partially determined by the 
regulatory regime governing its provision.198 
Three significant types of financial advisors now play a major role in 
dispensing personalized investment advice and influencing retail capital 
allocation decisions: (i) brokers or stockbrokers; (ii) insurance salespeople or 
producers; and (iii) registered investment advisers.199 Importantly, many 
financial advisors now operate within all three roles at the same time.200 For 
these financial advisors, the proposal will significantly reduce the amount of 
regulatory complexity they face.201 While the proposal will significantly affect 
stockbrokers and insurance producers, it will not significantly alter the 
business model of most registered investment advisers.202  
1. Brokers 
Banning commission compensation will have a significant impact on the 
business model for many broker-dealer firms. Brokers, the registered 
representatives of broker-dealer firms, now provide extensive, personalized 
investment advice to retail customers—a shift from their past as providers of 
execution services.203 For the most part, brokers receive transaction-based 
                                                                                                                     
 197 See Barbara Black, How to Improve Retail Investor Protection After the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 59, 77–78 
(2010) (discussing different standards); Lazaro & Edwards, supra note 9, at 61–71; 
Russell, supra note 108, at 41 (“Individual savers now make those decisions with the 
assistance of financial services players who have deeply misaligned incentives”). 
 198 Matthew L. Kozora, The Effect of Regulatory Regimes on the Provision of Retail 
Investment Advice 8 (Sept. 9, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=23 
23519 [https://perma.cc/FF8G-Y5NA]. 
 199 COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 12, at 6. 
 200 Id. 
 201 Cf. id. (“[I]ndividual advisers can switch back and forth between . . . regimes as 
they engage in different activities, a practice known as dual hatting.”). 
 202 See Lazaro & Edwards, supra note 9, at 48 (describing the fragmented market for 
personalized investment advice in detail). 
 203 While brokers once provided execution services, they now describe themselves as 
financial advisors. See FIDUCIARY STUDY, supra note 7, at i. See generally Laby, supra 
note 7 (explaining how changes in the industry made the existing regulatory structure 
incoherent). Broker business cards frequently employ titles such as “financial advisor,” 
“financial consultant,” “financial representative,” “investment specialist,” “investment 
representative,” and “registered representative.” ANGELA A. HUNG ET AL., INVESTOR AND 
INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS 74 (2008), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-1_randiabdreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/4DUN-
Y3K7]. 
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commission compensation—if the customer does not buy or sell something, 
the broker does not get paid.204  
Differential commissions also bias advice from brokers. Importantly, a 
broker may receive more compensation for selling one product over another—
justifying a concern that brokers give skewed, self-serving advice.205 The 
differential commission problem has given rise to the rule of thumb known as 
“Brown’s law of brokerage product compensation,” instructing that “[t]he 
higher the commission or selling concession a broker is paid to sell a product, 
the worse that product will be for his or her clients.”206 
While brokers have an obligation not to commit outright fraud, the law 
does not always require them to act in their clients’ best interests.207 FINRA 
has rules requiring that brokers and brokerage firms giving personalized 
advice “observe high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable 
principles of trade.”208 Adding specificity, FINRA also requires brokers to 
adhere to FINRA Rule 2111 when giving advice to retail customers. FINRA’s 
“Suitability” rule provides that: 
A member or an associated person must have a reasonable basis to 
believe that a recommended transaction or investment strategy involving a 
security or securities is suitable for the customer, based on the information 
obtained through the reasonable diligence of the member or associated person 
to ascertain the customer’s investment profile. A customer’s investment 
profile includes, but is not limited to, the customer’s age, other investments, 
financial situation and needs, tax status, investment objectives, investment 
experience, investment time horizon, liquidity needs, risk tolerance, and any 
                                                                                                                     
 204 See James S. Wrona, The Best of Both Worlds: A Fact-Based Analysis of the Legal 
Obligations of Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers and a Framework for Enhanced 
Investor Protection, 68 BUS. LAW. 1, 5–6 (2012). The requirement that brokers do 
transactions in order to get paid has, of course, created a bias toward action. In the extreme, 
this has given rise to a “churning” problem—where brokers cause excessive trading in 
client accounts to generate more fees. See Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up as 
They Go Along: The Role of Law in Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 
1010–11 (2002) (“Churning is excessive trading by a broker in a customer’s account in 
order to generate commissions.”). 
 205 See Langevoort, supra note 10, at 448 (discussing differential commissions). 
 206 See BROWN, supra note 31, at 217–18. 
 207 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012) (prohibiting “any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may 
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors”). In some instances, brokerage firms may simply conduct a cost-benefit analysis 
and decide to simply evade or ignore legal norms, accepting later sanctions as a cost of 
doing business. See Vincent Di Lorenzo, Does the Law Encourage Unethical Conduct in 
the Securities Industry?, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 765, 773 (2006) (presenting a 
case study focused on conflicts of interest in connection with “misleading reports issued by 
securities analysts”). 
 208 FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., FINRA MANUAL r. 2010, http://finra.complinet.c 
om/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&element_id=607 [https://perma.cc/VR4E-G5E2]. 
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other information the customer may disclose to the member or associated 
person in connection with such recommendation.209 
FINRA’s broad “suitability” standard seemingly leaves brokers substantial 
leeway to recommend a variety of investments, so long as they are not 
manifestly unsuitable—a vague standard in application.210 Notably, FINRA’s 
“high standard of commercial honor” or suitability rule does not require 
brokers to give their clients advice that is in their best interest.211 When a 
range of different investments appear “suitable,” this standard is frequently 
read as allowing brokers to sell their clients the one that pays the broker the 
most.212 Still, FINRA’s suitability rule does place some limits on rapacious 
exploitation. Although they do not go so far as to say that brokers must act in 
their customers’ interests, enforcement decisions and guidance materials have 
claimed that suitable recommendations are ones that are “consistent with [a] 
customer[’s] best interests.”213 
This leaves substantial room for manipulation. Inducing retail investors to 
make decisions that are not in their best interest may be a type of manipulation 
and deception that falls short of outright fraud—and a tremendously profitable 
business opportunity for more sophisticated parties to profit from the 
suboptimal decisions of less sophisticated parties.214  
For the most part, the law now regulates brokers as salespeople who owe 
limited duties at the time of sale.215 Only in particular circumstances—such as 
when the broker assumes discretionary control over the account—will a broker 
                                                                                                                     
 209 Id. r. 2111(a) (A “member” is a broker-dealer and an “associated person” is a 
broker). 
 210 Vague legal standards allow financial entities to argue that they have complied with 
their obligations because the exact action required may not be clear. See Di Lorenzo, supra 
note 207, at 786 (“Neither the legal mandate nor the required course of action is clear, and, 
therefore, denial of noncompliance becomes a prevailing practice.”). 
 211 See BIRDTHISTLE, supra note 4, at 149 (“Brokers . . . are subject merely to a 
standard under which they may recommend only investments that are ‘suitable’ for their 
clients . . . .”); Christine Lazaro, Fiduciary Duty - Now and in the Future, 17 PIABA B.J. 
129, 132 (2010) (“[T]he suitability standard requires that a recommendation merely be 
suitable for a customer, not necessarily that it be in the customer’s best interest.”). 
 212 See Patricia A. McCoy, Degrees of Intermediation, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 551, 
571 (2015) (“Because the duty of suitability is not a fiduciary duty, securities brokers are 
not required to act in their clients’ best interests or diversify their portfolios . . . . Nor must 
brokers avoid recommending investments that will maximize their fees if their advice is 
suitable otherwise.”). 
 213 See Wrona, supra note 204, at 19 & n.137 (emphasis added) (quoting a collection 
of sources). 
 214 Cf. Lauren E. Willis, Performance-Based Consumer Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1309, 
1311 (2015) (“In a growing number of consumer transactions today, firms exploit 
consumer confusion and promote poor buying choices. The resulting transactions are often 
lousy, whether one uses autonomy, welfare, or fairness as the metric.”). 
 215 Wrona, supra note 204, at 93; see also supra text accompanying note 205. 
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owe continuing duties to monitor a retail investor’s account or provide 
ongoing advice in the best interest of the investor.216  
The proposal does not impose any ongoing duties on brokers or otherwise 
modify their suitability obligation. Rather, it simply removes the incentive to 
misallocate retail investor capital to secure commission revenues. This focus 
on compensation will not necessarily ensure that brokers give higher-quality 
advice. At the least, it will remove the temptation to misallocate capital in 
exchange for a commission. 
2. Insurance Producers 
The proposal will also significantly affect insurance salespersons 
providing investment advice. Importantly, securities intermediaries are not the 
only financial intermediaries extracting revenue from retail investors. 
Insurance salespersons, also known as producers, now market themselves as 
financial advisors and pitch increasingly complex products to retail investors 
in exchange for commission-based compensation.217  
While the suitability standard and other FINRA rules govern the 
personalized investment advice retail customers receive from brokers, 
insurance salespeople operate within a looser, state-by-state regulatory 
framework.218 Now, many states impose a suitability framework modeled on 
FINRA’s rules for annuity sales.219 Still, commissions—some as high as 
12%—may create powerful conflicts of interest for insurance producers to sell 
complex deferred annuities to retail investors that do not need them.220 
3. Registered Investment Advisers 
Registered Investment Advisers (investment advisers) are a different class 
of retail and institutional financial intermediaries and may not be significantly 
                                                                                                                     
 216 Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 823 (2002) (recognizing that the 
broker managing a discretionary account owed fiduciary duties); Leib v. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 951, 953 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (“[T]he broker 
handling a discretionary account becomes the fiduciary of his customer in a broad sense.”), 
aff’d, 647 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1981). For a discussion of other circumstances where brokers 
may owe ongoing fiduciary duties, see Edwards, supra note 9, at 112–16. 
 217 See Lazaro & Edwards, supra note 9, at 68–71. 
 218 Id. 
 219 Id. at 79. 
 220 Zeke Faux & Margaret Collins, Indexed Annuities Obscure Fees as Sellers Earn 
Trip to Disney, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 20, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-
20/indexed-annuities-obscure-fees-as-sellers-earn-trip-to-disney.html [https://perma.cc/TS6 
Y-2X9W] (“Salespeople are paid commissions as high as 12 percent, and some are 
rewarded with free trips to Disney World. Unlike the fees on mutual funds, those costs 
aren’t disclosed.”). 
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affected by the proposal.221 Investment advisers are directly regulated by the 
states and the SEC under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers 
Act).222 The statute defines investment advisers as  
any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising 
others, either directly or through publications or writings, as to the value of 
securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling 
securities, or who, for compensation and as part of a regular business, issues 
or promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities.223 
Investment advisers differ from brokers and insurance producers in the 
duties they owe and the form of compensation they receive. Although the 
Advisers Act does not explicitly provide for fiduciary duties, the federal courts 
have interpreted it as imposing a fiduciary duty.224 Yet, what, exactly, does 
this duty require? As Justice Frankfurter famously explained, “to say that a 
man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry. To 
whom is he a fiduciary? What obligations does he owe as a fiduciary?”225 To 
answer this question, the SEC has explained that investment advisers owe 
duties of loyalty and care to their clients.226 An investment adviser’s duty of 
loyalty requires it to “serve the best interests of its clients, which includes an 
obligation not to subordinate the clients’ interests to its own.”227 The Supreme 
Court has recognized that in passing the Advisers Act, Congress sought “to 
eliminate conflicts of interest between the investment adviser and the clients” 
                                                                                                                     
 221 Advisers provide a “wide range of advisory services and play an important role in 
helping individuals and institutions make significant financial decisions.” Amendments to 
Form ADV, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3060, 75 Fed. Reg. 49234, 49234 (Aug. 
11, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279) (explaining that investment advisers help 
“individuals and families seeking to plan for retirement or save for college to large 
institutions managing billions of dollars”). 
 222 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2012). See generally Christine Lazaro, The Future of 
Financial Advice: Eliminating the False Distinction Between Brokers and Investment 
Advisers, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 381 (2013) (describing regulation under the Advisers Act). 
 223 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11). While this broad definition would seemingly include 
brokers who also make money by providing personalized investment advice, the statute 
specifically exempts brokers from the statute. Id. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C) (stating the definition 
does not apply to “any broker or dealer whose performance of such [advisory] services is 
solely incidental to the conduct of his business as a broker or dealer and who receives no 
special compensation therefor”).  
 224 See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 
191 (1963) (holding that under the Advisers Act, a relationship between an investment 
advisor and a client is fiduciary in nature). 
 225 Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85–86 (1943). 
 226 See FIDUCIARY STUDY, supra note 7, at 22. 
 227 Id.  
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to “safeguard[]” unsophisticated investors.228 Where the conflicts cannot be 
eliminated, the Advisers Act requires disclosure.229 
To further limit conflicts of interest, the Advisers Act also closely 
regulates investment adviser compensation.230 Investment advisers must 
clearly disclose to clients how they receive compensation and only “charge 
fees that are fair and reasonable, and when an [investment] adviser’s fee is 
higher than others, an adviser must disclose this.”231 Reducing the incentive to 
recommend one product over another or to trade simply to generate 
commissions, the overwhelming majority (approximately 95%) of investment 
advisers charge clients fees “based on [a] percentage of assets under 
management.”232 
These limits do not mean that the registered investment adviser model 
entirely prevents compensation incentives from skewing the advice 
provided.233 Because most investment advisers receive compensation for 
assets under management, they may hesitate to recommend wise actions that 
move assets outside of their management—such as paying down a loan or 
purchasing a life insurance policy.234 Alternatively, they may recommend risk-
increasing transactions that increase assets under management—for example, 
suggesting that an investor mortgage a paid-off home to put the money in the 
market.235 
While asset-based fees do come with some conflicts, these conflicts appear 
less likely to cause the misallocation of retail investor capital.236 The proposal 
seeks to mitigate these harms by requiring clear annual disclosure of asset-
based fees and for retail investors to confirm that they desire to continue 
receiving the investment adviser’s services on an annual basis. 
Moreover, asset-based fees may be particularly inappropriate for passive 
buy and hold investors. The SEC has recently begun to focus on a new 
problem—reverse churning.237 This occurs when investment advisers 
regularly collect fees for assets under management even when the account 
                                                                                                                     
 228 Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 191. 
 229 Id. at 191–92 (explaining that the disclosure requirement is intended “to eliminate, 
or at least to expose, all conflicts of interest which might incline an investment adviser—
consciously or unconsciously—to render advice which was not disinterested”). 
 230 See FIDUCIARY STUDY, supra note 7, at 40. 
 231 Id. 
 232 Id. at 7. While most charge based on assets under management, a small number 
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 233 See Edwards, supra note 9, at 110. 
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 237 Daisy Maxey, SEC Targets ‘Reverse Churning’ by Advisers, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 
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602 [https://perma.cc/VM76-A8CU]. 
2017] CONFLICTS & CAPITAL ALLOCATION 219 
requires little to no management.238 For example, consider the needs of a 
twenty-five-year-old receiving a modest inheritance. If she decides to 
passively invest the assets and leave them untouched for the next ten to fifteen 
years, she secures substantially lower returns with little benefit by paying an 
investment adviser 1.5% per year. 
4. The Regulatory Arbitrage Problem 
The proposal also solves the arbitrage problem.239 Retail financial 
intermediaries may now even engage in a form of regulatory arbitrage to 
exploit differences between current regulatory structures to their own 
advantage.240 Regulatory arbitrage occurs when parties shift similar 
transactions from one regulatory regime to another to maximize their own 
profits.241 For example, some reverse churning may be regulatory arbitrage—
when a financial advisor registered as both a broker and an investment adviser 
has secured substantial commission-based revenue from a brokerage client, 
she may persuade the client to transfer her account to an investment adviser’s 
assets under management fee structure, allowing the financial advisor to 
collect additional compensation from a client account that does not need 
assistance.242 Similarly, a broker who is also registered as an insurance 
salesperson may decide to sell the client an insurance product to secure a 
higher fee than could be secured by a securities product.243 Regulating 
                                                                                                                     
 238 See FIDUCIARY STUDY, supra note 7, at 152 (describing reverse churning). 
 239 See, e.g., Lily Batchelder & Jared Bernstein, Is Your Financial Adviser Making 
Money Off Your Bad Investments?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
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[https://perma.cc/44P2-7NZK] (explaining that the SEC “doesn’t have authority over all 
retirement investments,” “[f]or example, it can’t protect you if your broker recommends 
one fixed annuity over a similar but better one because he is receiving a side payment from 
the first provider”). 
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transnational regulatory arbitrage; and Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives and the Costs 
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 241 See BIRDTHISTLE, supra note 4, at 149 (explaining that brokers giving financial 
advice may be a form of regulatory arbitrage with brokers marketing themselves as advice-
givers without the accompanying burdens of loyalty imposed by the Advisers Act). 
 242 See FIDUCIARY STUDY, supra note 7, at 152. 
 243 Similarly, registered investment advisers have been known to construct retirement 
plans before transitioning to a role as a broker for purchasing the assets for those plans. 
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commission compensation across these domains will create a consistent 
standard.244 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR STAKEHOLDERS AND ALTERNATIVES 
Implementing a blanket prohibition on commission compensation for 
retail financial advice will have significant implications for the financial 
markets. This Part considers these implications and weighs alternative 
proposals, ultimately concluding that a blanket prohibition does the most to get 
to the root of the problem. 
A. Implications 
1. Retail Investors and Financial Advisors 
Some have argued that altering the current commission-based 
compensation system might reduce the public’s access to financial advice.245 
That is, those who would have received the attention of a financial advisor 
may find themselves making financial decisions without that assistance.246 
This argument assumes that access to a conflicted financial advisor would 
be better than a situation where the market did not provide a financial 
advisor.247 Some evidence indicates that many persons would make better 
decisions without the self-serving assistance of commission-compensated 
financial advisors.248 A study of one state retirement system found that 
portfolios of persons that used a broker for assistance were substantially worse 
                                                                                                                     
See, e.g., Ron A. Rhoades, Fiduciary Duties: What Policymakers and the Public Need to 
Know, BROKE & BROKER BLOG (June 22, 2009), http://www.brokeandbroker.com/index.ph 
p?a=blog&id=203 [https://perma.cc/822Z-8S94] (“There is at least one large broker-dealer 
/ RIA firm which primarily markets . . . ‘financial plans’ for its clients. Yet, when it comes 
to implementation of the plan, many . . . representatives of this firm ‘switch hats’ to a non-
fiduciary role and sell products (which are often proprietary mutual funds).”). 
 244 Anne Tucker has recognized this problem and noted that issues addressed within 
agency silos impact behavior before other agencies. See Tucker, supra note 94, at 217 
(“The issues addressed in each agency’s silo—workplace, tax, or securities—have 
implications in the other arenas as well.”). 
 245 See, e.g., Batchelder & Bernstein, supra note 239 (“Critics of the proposal argue 
that it would hurt the retirement security of low- and middle-income Americans by 
reducing access to financial advice, as if more advice equals good advice.”). 
 246 Id. 
 247 Indeed, many retirees would be better off without the assistance they now receive 
in free-lunch seminars. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N ET AL., supra note 164, at 11 
(discussing free-lunch sales seminars). 
 248 See Russell, supra note 108, at 64 (“Financial advisers, including brokers (who 
have no fiduciary duty to their clients), make the problem worse. Most of them are 
compensated based on (entirely legal) kickbacks.”). 
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than portfolios that were constructed without a broker’s assistance.249 Another 
recent audit study presented financial advisors, here brokers, with client 
portfolios to see what changes they would recommend, if any.250 
Unsurprisingly, the brokers showed a strong bias toward recommending 
changes that would move client assets to high-fee mutual funds that would pay 
the brokers more money and deliver lower expected returns for their clients.251  
Furthermore, small investors will not be without options. The proposal 
would likely accelerate the growth of so-called robo-advisers.252 Financial 
technology may disrupt much of the traditional investment advice business by 
allowing algorithms to select appropriate portfolios for persons that meet 
particular characteristics. For example, one leading firm, Wealthfront, 
manages over $2 billion in assets and supports accounts as small as $500.253 It 
does not even charge an advisory fee on accounts below $10,000.254 For 
accounts over $10,000, investors pay 0.25% of the assets under 
management.255  
On the whole, the proposal will likely reduce the total amount of capital 
flowing to financial advisors for their services. While the size of the reduction 
cannot be predicted with precision, one recent report conservatively estimated 
that the total costs imposed on account of conflicted investment advice now 
run to about $17 billion annually.256 Implementing the proposal would result 
in investors allocating that $17 billion dollars to other uses.257  
                                                                                                                     
 249 See generally John Chalmers & Jonathan Reuter, Is Conflicted Investment Advice 
Better Than No Advice? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18158, 
2012), http:// www.nber.org/papers/w18158 [https://perma.cc/U5D3-EQQ3]. 
 250 See generally Sendhil Mullainathan et al., The Market for Financial Advice: An 
Audit Study (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17929, 2012), http:// 
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https://support.wealthfront.com/hc/en-us/articles/211003683-Fee-How-much-does-Wealthf 
ront-charge-for-its-service- [https://perma.cc/PG76-ZBJZ] (last updated Mar. 24, 2017).  
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 256 COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 12, at 2. 
 257 This could also have other effects, perhaps reducing consumption in the market for 
luxury goods. Cf. FRED SCHWED, JR., WHERE ARE THE CUSTOMERS’ YACHTS? (John Wiley 
& Sons, Inc. 2006) (1940) (pointing out that while certain financial intermediaries had 
yachts, their customers did not). 
222 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78:1 
2. Asset Managers 
The proposal also has significant implications for asset managers seeking 
to gather capital to manage. At the least, it will mean that funds will no longer 
be able to attract retail capital by paying financial intermediaries to 
recommend the funds to their retail clients. This may force asset managers to 
incur other expenses to advertise their funds to financial advisors. It will also 
remove any incentive to pay fees to financial advisors to keep pace with other 
funds. 
In the alternative, asset managers may move away from the retail market 
and focus their offerings on accredited investors.258 This, of course, does not 
mean that retail investors would be prohibited from participating in these 
funds, but simply that their decision to invest in these funds would not be 
affected by incentive fees paid to their financial advisor. 
B. Alternatives 
The proposal is not the only means to address the problem. Policymakers 
have pursued several different interventions. But, while many of these 
alternatives seem likely to yield benefits worth the costs, none seem as 
effective as simply banning commission compensation in connection with the 
provision of personalized investment advice.  
1. Financial Literacy Education 
One oft-proposed solution to the problem is to give retail investors better 
financial education so that they may better protect their interests.259 Because 
financial advisors and financial services firms often exploit the sophistication 
gap between them and their clients, financial literacy education aims to reduce 
the size of the gap by improving retail investors’ financial sophistication, 
enabling retail investors to protect themselves.260 Yet, overemphasis on 
financial literacy education risks victim blaming by portraying the investor as 
                                                                                                                     
 258 For a discussion of how retail investors are already largely excluded from many 
private funds now, see Cary Martin Shelby, Privileged Access to Financial Innovation, 47 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 315, 367 (2015), who argues that “antiquated regulations have excluded 
retail investors from many of the [financial innovation’s] benefits.” 
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of the retail customer (the principal) to monitor the performance of her registered 
representative, to assure that he is making decisions consistent with her investment 
objectives, is minimal.”); Benjamin P. Edwards, Disaggregated Classes, 9 VA. L. & BUS. 
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action litigation reforms by seeking to improve monitoring); Tucker, supra note 94, at 224–
25 (discussing the need for improved investor education).  
 260 See Tucker, supra note 94, at 224–25. 
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somewhat at fault for being taken in by manipulation and deception.261 It does 
not focus on the force driving the manipulation and deception—the incentive 
to collect a commission. 
Not all problems should be solved by recommending that the victims 
better learn to protect themselves. Consider the wisdom of a sheriff warning 
travelers that bandits lurk in the forests ahead and offering them free materials 
to learn more information about self-defense techniques. This type of 
protection from a public regulator seems less effective than having the sheriff 
provide a warning while spending more resources to saddle up and clear the 
woods. Worse, persons may review a few glossy pamphlets and mistakenly 
believe themselves capable. To the extent that regulators allocate funds to 
investor education initiatives, they should be effectively designed and based 
on research showing a likelihood of effectiveness.262 
Pursuing financial literacy education as a strategy to improve capital 
allocation appears to be a game that is not worth the candle: the cost of 
effectively educating retail investors to understand modern financial 
innovation would outweigh any benefits.263 To begin, retail investors generally 
exhibit low levels of financial literacy.264 Adding to the difficulty, many 
investors make significant decisions when they enter retirement—a period 
when many may be experiencing cognitive decline.265 Given the demands that 
most retail investors already face on their time, it seems unlikely that a critical 
enough mass would actually take advantage of financial literacy programs, 
even if they were available. And, if this confluence of unlikely events were to 
occur, financial innovation would likely create new products that had not been 
covered by prior education programs.  
To a large extent, this approach has already been tried and appears to be a 
failure.266 This is not to say that resources should not be devoted to investor 
education; rather, financial literacy should not be promoted as a means of 
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avoiding more difficult regulatory initiatives, allowing policymakers to claim 
that they are addressing a problem without directly confronting well-funded 
industry lobbyists. 
2. Subsidizing Financial Advice 
Another possible intervention would be for the government to subsidize 
unbiased financial advice. Indeed, Robert Shiller has argued that a government 
subsidy for “financial and legal advice” could be “justified on the basis of the 
externality provided by having a society that functions well.”267 While 
providing unbiased, expert assistance to retail investors allocating assets could 
certainly improve overall capital allocation, funding such a project would be 
quite costly. If the market failed to provide adequate financial advice to 
improve capital allocation after prohibiting commission compensation, the 
strategy might be worth pursuing because even high costs might be justified to 
the extent that it could reduce the likelihood of additional financial crises.268 
This alternative should be considered as a complement to banning commission 
compensation. 
3. Imposing Fiduciary Duties 
One promising additional mechanism to address the problem might be to 
require financial advisors to act in the best interests of their clients without 
regard to their personal financial interests. This mechanism would likely also 
function well with a flat ban on commission compensation. Here, the cost of 
additional liability from an enforceable fiduciary obligation to provide advice 
in the best interests of customers would more firmly bond financial advisors to 
their clients’ interests. If an advisor gave self-serving advice, an enforceable 
fiduciary obligation would allow the investor to seek damages. 
At present, there are two different regulatory levers available to impose 
fiduciary duties: (i) the SEC; or (ii) the Department of Labor (DOL). As to the 
first, Dodd-Frank authorized the SEC to impose fiduciary duties on a subset of 
financial advisors by harmonizing broker obligations with those of registered 
investment advisers.269 For reasons that remain unclear, the SEC has not yet 
acted under this authority. One former SEC Chairman has remarked that delay 
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appears to be driven by philosophical divisions that will cause SEC 
Commissioners to remain “locked in conflict on this issue for a long, long 
time.”270 
While the SEC has the power to impose a fiduciary duty on brokers and 
registered investment advisers, its power is still limited. While Dodd-Frank 
authorized the imposition of a fiduciary duty, it also included a provision 
stating that the “receipt of compensation based on commission or fees shall 
not, in and of itself, be considered a violation of such standard applied to a 
broker, dealer, or investment adviser,” seemingly limiting the SEC’s ability to 
target commission compensation directly.271 Moreover, even if the SEC were 
to act to impose a fiduciary duty on brokers and registered investment 
advisers, that duty would not stretch to reach insurance producers—persons 
now providing the same sorts of services as brokers and investment 
advisers.272 
In the absence of action from the SEC and over extensive industry 
opposition,273 the DOL has proposed to use its authority under the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act to impose a fiduciary duty on all persons 
providing advice in connection with retirement accounts.274 While the new 
DOL rule has not yet been fully implemented, if it survives, it seems likely to 
affect nearly all capital-allocation decisions involving retirement accounts, 
including instances where retail investors receive advice from insurance 
producers.275 From a capital-allocation perspective, imposing a fiduciary duty 
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on advisors may offer significant benefits for the economy by reducing the 
likelihood that advisors will misallocate client assets in exchange for 
commissions.  
While a fiduciary rule promulgated by the DOL might provide significant 
benefits, this Article’s proposal seeks an even broader reform—one that would 
affect all retail investor assets, not merely assets held within the retirement 
accounts that give rise to the DOL’s jurisdiction. While the DOL’s approach 
will likely do much good, broader benefits could be achieved by creating a 
consistent standard for retirement and non-retirement funds. This is not to say 
that the DOL’s proposal does not deserve enthusiastic support simply because 
it would be better to have Congress enact more far-reaching legislation.  
The vociferous opposition raised by certain issuers of high-commission 
products provides evidence that the DOL’s fiduciary rule may significantly 
affect the allocation of retirement account capital.276 Put simply, certain 
issuers will likely see their capital inflows reduced in a fiduciary 
environment—forcing them to develop some other strategy to attract capital—
perhaps by improving their returns.277 Consider, for example, the objections 
raised by non-traded REITs, a sector that has generally fought against the 
implementation of a fiduciary standard.278 Spokespersons for the interests of 
non-traded REITs have argued that under an early iteration of the DOL 
fiduciary rule, investors could lose their ability to diversify by adding non-
traded REITs to their investment portfolios, an unpersuasive argument because 
retail investors could achieve real estate exposure by buying a publicly traded 
REIT.279 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article shows that the economic interests of financial advisors play a 
significant role in shaping capital allocation decisions, and that the 
misalignment of those incentives and the interests of retail investors generates 
cascading harms for ordinary investors and the capital markets. The current 
commission compensation structure for many financial advisors means that 
corrosive conflicts of interest undermine efficient capital allocation. This 
Article aims to improve capital allocation, by focusing regulatory attention on 
the source of much capital misallocation—commission compensation 
structures that encourage financial advisors to induce investors to make unwise 
decisions. 
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